THE PURSUIT OF STABILITY in MENA

IS A NEW WAVE OF ARAB SPRING POSSIBLE?

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY; UNTIL JULY 15

The Ugly Face of **Human Rights in Egypt**

Islamic Banking
The Solution for the Failing Conventional Banking

Israel
Religiously Divided Structure of the Israeli Jewish Society

Sudanese Limbo in the Transition Period

The crisis of **democracy in Algeria**

The Polemics and **Politics of Ethiopia**

INSAMER is a research center of

EDITORIAL

"Publish or Perish." We decided to start this project using one of the most influential mottos in the academic world. INSAMER is set to interpret its own sensitivities concerning the new wave of dynamics in the world. We undertake to ease human suffering by conducting practice-based research and producing knowledge that provides guidance to researchers and policy-makers.

The first issue of Inter Notional magazine deals with social tension in North Africa and the Middle East. Whether another Arab spring is possible or not, and the political dynamics in Egypt, Sudan, Algeria and Ethiopia are some of our cases in this issue. Inter notional also touches on Turkey's civil-military relations' breaking points as its cover story.

This issue also looks at the thematic problems of the international politics such as humanitarian aid, environmental concerns and Islamic economy.

We wish you a pleasant reading…

Contents

Articles

WORLD IN
2018-19

THE WEAKENING OF THE WEST WORSENS BECAUSE OF #BREXIT

Hopest hat the United Kingdom could or chestrate an orderly divorce from the European Union (EU) faded.

TRUMP TRIGGERS A TRADE WAR AND MORE

"I want tariffs," Donald Trump told his advisers in July 2017. In 2018, he got his wish.

DIRE WARNINGS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE MOUNT

Scientists have been telling us this for more than three decades and evidence backs them up.

THE UNITED STATES LEAVES THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

Donald Trump vowed in his campaign trail to with draw the United States from the Iran uclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

THE MURDER OF KASHOGGI

On October 2 Saudi dissident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. He didn't come out alive.

ETHIOPIA SIGNS A PEACE DEAL WITH ERITREA

In June, new Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed surprised the world by announcing he would accept a peace deal with Eritrea that had been gathering dust for eighteen years.

BITCOIN AND OTHER CRYPTO CURRENCIES EXPERIENCED A FALL FROM GRACE

The crypto currency industry hit a peak in January 2018, have since lost more than $670 billion in capital. The industry has been on a steady decline throughout 2018.

HUMANITARIAN CRISES DEEPEN IN YEMEN AND VENEZUELA

Venezuela and Yemen were two sad stories in 2017. Things only got worse in both countries in 2018.

TURKEY IN
2018-19

Russia has completed Turkey's first **S-400** shipment.

General elections were held throughout Turkey. Erdogan secured another five-year term by winning the presidential election.

The Turkish lira hit a record low of 7.23 per dollar.

Pastor Andrew Brunson was released after 656 days of imprisonment in Turkey.

Turkey sent Yavuz vessel for **oil exploration** in east Mediterranean.

Turkey conducted military operations in northern Syria and Iraq to eradicate **'terror threat'** in Afrin, Cerablus, and Albab.

The Turkish government ended the nationwide state of emergency that was imposed two years ago after **a failed coup attempt.**

Is a new "Arab Spring" **possible?**

RİAD DOMAZETİ

After a young man named Muhammad Buazizi set himself on fire on December 17th 2010, a major social movement started in both local and world politics. Shortly after gaining their independence, small authorities in Northern Africa and the Middle East started to fall due to ideological dilemmas and poverty. This event resulted in the expression of basic human demands such as equality, freedom, justice, and equal economic distribution to regimes that hold their people under strict control for many years with various daily ideologic maneuvers.

However, in a short amount of time, the righteous expressions of the society started to face oppression and criminalization thanks to the help of local and international actors. On one hand maneuvers of the USA, Russia, China and the EU, and on the other hand the criminalization of the process by some local countries namely Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE using terrorist groups, their support for coups, and their century old-age attempts at preserving the present status quo; all of these efforts caused the local communities to go through major catastrophic events. It would be no surprise then, to see the emergence of movements that questioned the qualifications of oppressive groups and regimes in the Arab world where there is no political elites.

On the present day, the attempts of taking all these structures under the umbrella of the regime seem to have taken control of politic, sociologic, and religious movements by limiting them to a certain extent. It seems that the local communities are still quite far from the free and lawful order that they demanded since the last month of 2010. Likewise, the regimes in Syria and Egypt, despite all efforts of their people, are still present with the help of foreign countries. The civil wars in Libya and Yemen, also with the help and intervention of foreign countries, are causing major destructions.

Events that Triggered the Arab Spring and the Perspective of the Future

Despite all preventions, the post-Arab Spring effects are still to be seen in the region. The examples that are evident of the vibrant willpower of the people seem to be increasing day by day. For example, following the latest executions in Egypt, Egyptian youth created the "Tahrir Again" slogan online where it became a current issue in the country. At the end of the fifth year since the military coup took place; while inflation and unemployment are rising at a major rate, Egyptian currency continues to lose value. Along with all these economic problems, social inequality among others is resulting in the expansion of people's repercussions in sub-groups against the regime. Additionally, events such as traffic accidents, fires and similar negativities due to poor quality of infrastructure seem to have diminished the patience of the people against order even further.

Besides, it is feared that the communal movements that started in France called "rebellion against inequality" might spread to many Arab countries including Egypt. The Egyptian media was quick to report of the "yellow vest" sales limitation as well as the increasing precautions against possible protests by labor unions. However, how much longer can the Egyptian regime, which is neither overpassing nor addressing the rights of the people, and instead are responding the demands with terror, ignore the will of its people?

This situation does not only happen in Egypt. We can see similar restlessness in the Gulf countries too. People react negatively to the Gulf countries' reestablishment of their embassies in Damascus as a way of giving legitimacy to the Assad regime.

When we look at Jordan in this scope for example, where some protests have been organized, it is clear that the events have violent tendencies from time to time; yet the government hasn't come up with the right policies or regulations to preserve stability of the country. It is possible to witness a similar situation in Sudan. The protests that criticize the regime became even more intense despite the country's martial law enforcement. Sudan's media broadcast are skimmed or manipulated by the government. And while the protests are going on, Omar al-Bashir formed a cabinet, which mostly made of the army. It is a too optimistic statement to say that only time will tell how this move will soothe the restlessness of the people.

The situation is no different in North Africa, either. Abdulaziz Boutfelika's participation in the upcoming presidential elections that is going to be his fifth, after ruling Algeria for 20 years, is causing protests. The news show that the protests are getting even more intense. It is being reported that Bouteflika who is old and has major health problems went to Sweden and France many times for treatment. A group that consists of some generals and consultants supports Bouteflika who rejects to share the administration and transferring it to the people despite the aforementioned situation.

Palestine, being one of the most important crises points in the region, shows that no solution for the century-old problem can be seen in sight. Trump's New Middle East Plan pleases neither the Palestinians nor the people who live in the region. Even though the "Deal of the Century", which has become a byword lately, contains articles that offer Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli peace in the model of French–German peace; the implementation of the plan is obviously hard to achieve.

At this point, the question of how and how much the Arab Spring transformed the region and its people becomes a major point of interest. It should be questioned how this process shaped the ruling class, cultural elites, military-bureaucratic mechanism, religious groups, and people in the Middle East as well as the Arab communities. The question of the efficiency of the processes-which resemble the Arab Spring-in the future also should be thought about.

To sum up, the main question that deserve an answer at this point is: "Is it possible for the emergence of a new wave of a communal movement to reflect people's will to revitalize today's Middle East, despite the current situation caused by the painful and controversial Arab Spring?"

The Haunting Phenomena of the Arab Spring

Analyzing the triggers of the Arab Spring, we can see that the process is based upon simple yet fundamental humanitarian notions like a respectful and honorable life, freedom, justice and equality. Even though the economic injustice was seen to be the triggering motivation in the process, it can be understood that the demands are far beyond it. However, the people are still far from meeting their demands at this point after eight years of the process.

To make matters worse, the size of the sources that were allocated for wars by the Arab ruling class forced the people to live under even worse conditions. Budget for security in crisis zones, such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen failed both the living conditions and purchase power of the people substantially.

While the Arab insurgencies affect the geopolitics of the Middle East profoundly; the weaponry agreement, worth 120-300 billion dollars between the USA and Saudi Arabia at such a time received some serious criticization. The derogatory and dishonoring approach that was used during the meeting

between Donald Trump and Muhammad bin Salman in the White House tarnished the Arab World's honor, particularly the Gulf countries.

In the region where violation of human rights and unlawfulness are ongoing at a fast pace; thinkers, activists and religious scholars who express their ideas independently are arrested and imprisoned unlawfully, unfairly and without any kind of explanation. Besides; homicides, assassinations, military interventions, and the competition of arming increase the restlessness of people even more.

In other respects; even though the facts that most Arab countries openly expressed that they have the intention of having close relations with Israel, that they are relying on Israel for national security, that they expect salvation from the West and all statements that lead to the alliance with the West and Israel are being treated as necessary steps taken with a pragmatist manner and are being legitimated by the authorities; it is not possible that a group of people who will eventually questions these relations may emerge and the process which triggered the Arab Spring may develop again.

This is because the foreign factor that triggered the Arab Spring is closely related to Arab countries' foreign policies. The one century-old occupation in Palestine and its relations with Israel are one of the main subjects that trigger social opposition in the Arab communities. The USA's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, the nation-state law enacted by the Netanyahu administration, declaration of Israel as a "Jewish State", Israel's ongoing

destruction of Palestinian residences (including those on the Gaza Strip), the ongoing blockade on Palestinians, the silence of Arab leaders on these issues serve as important factors that may cause a "silent rage" in the Arab world. Arab politicians must realize that the Palestinian issue determines the region's longstanding stability because the Palestinian conflict is one of the most important challenges of the Arab world.

All in all, the relations of Arab politicians with Israel are one of the basic reasons why legitimacy of these regimes experience erosion in the eyes of their people.

Foreign military presence in the Middle East, the Iraqi occupation and the military interventions are the main events that put the region under the microscope by the Arab people. Being one of the factors that inspired the Arab Spring, the issue of foreign military presence in the region only increased even more. Russia's and Iran's presence in Syria, USA, Russia and China troops in Libya, the return of the UK to the region with military bases, expansion of Chinese military and similar developments are escalating the distrust of people and their scrutiny against the elite.

The political and cultural elite in Arab countries who resist understanding the motivations of the Arab Spring, seem to be insensitive about the demands and expectations of the people. Arab leaders' ideological distance from the citizens and their manners as delegates of the West-and sometimes the socialist ideology-are major problems for the people. Besides from their ideological incompatibility in relation to people's expectations; the fact that they

> *All in all, political, sociological and psychological conditions caused by the Arab Spring are still present in the Middle East.*

have an intense socialist understanding as an ideological foundation is resulting in a large gap between themselves and their citizens in both their political manners and characteristics. Moreover, the fact that the political and cultural elite are administrators with dual passport and that they graduated from foreign schools are among the factors that supports the mentioned argument.

These psychological and mental motives that brought out the Arab Spring have been deepened in the last eight years. The fact that contemplation which is the basic qualification of being a human is oppressed and is seen as humiliating in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and for the most part of the region, is a psychological factor that is affective during the questioning process of present political systems.
To sum up, the fact that all ideological and physical motivations that resulted in the Arab Spring are still alive and dynamic; also, the fact that derogatory policies that harm people's self-respect, honor and character that are now being used with violence more than ever, are the main reasons which encourage the locals to rebel.

All in all, political, sociological and psychological conditions caused by the Arab Spring are still present in the Middle East. An honorable and respectable lifestyle, freedom, fair economic distribution, and social equality that Middle Easterners are in the search of, cannot be seen in sight. No new changes have been made in the formation of political processes which can help people determine their fates. Therefore, as long as people's disappointments continue; processes that resemble the Arab Spring will always be present. Because, the search of something

other than the current status quo, which has its colonial logic, is a part of human nature. Therefore, it is easy to say that events such as the Arab Spring will happen in the future under different names.

Lessons and Risks

In the last eight years, aforementioned social and political rebellions contain many experiences from which important lessons about the local people and local groups should be learned. The Arab Spring left behind a major humanitarian, political and social destruction; transformation of rebellions into civil war, inadequacy of life security and property, division of societies into sub-groups, ineffectiveness of local people in the change of the world order while it is being reshaped; and they are going to be the root of problems which will affect the fate of the region.

One important lesson learned is that there are still no competent mechanisms that can manage this social potential at the macro level. Because of the insufficient social preparation; the process is inevitably face major difficulties. But despite everything, it should be noted that this demand of change is unstoppable.

In conclusion it can be said that the causes of the Arab Spring, such as the absence of freedom, justice, equality, political participation; the inability of solving the Palestinian issue, current progresses of Israeli–Arab relations and Arab–West relations, especially in the issue of Jerusalem and Arab countries' foreign policies are responsible in the rise of serious anger within the Middle Eastern societies.

The Arab Spring left behind a major humanitarian, political and social destruction.

The Patterns of Civil-Military Relations:
The Western Standards and Turkey's Experience

SELİM VATANDAŞ

The western-centered international society operates with fundamental norms such as respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. These are the norms that, not expressing "what is" in the global system; however, constitute the keywords of the league to which the actors belong to. Today, almost all states form their own western-centered leagues by reproducing discourses and actions in line with the aforementioned principles, whether they believe them or not.

Among all these values, democracy is the cornerstone of the international society, which according to a short definition of Abraham Lincoln is the government of the people, by the people, for the people. Democracy can be defined as people's ability to choose their political leaders in one of its simplest forms in the context of civil-military relations. However, history shows that the military actors could always intervene with the people's choice without any legal justification.

Tensions in civil-military relations cause a paradox. This paradox starts with the possibility of the armed forces' obligation to protect the society to turn into a threat for the same society when they are overpowered. So how will a coup as the cause of the collapse of the legitimate political power be prevented? In other words, as the Roman poet Juenyan asked, who will guard the guardians?

The military may be the best actor to identify threats and give appropriate responses to that threat for a given risk level. But only a civil actor can describe and declare the acceptable risk level for a certain society. The military can request for the level of armaments to defend successfully against the enemies, but only the civilians can decide what the probability of a successful society is willing to pay for. The military can make warnings about the nature of the threat, but only a civilian actor can settle on whether to feel threatened and beyond how to respond. The military measures the risk, the civilian actor judges it. All in all, the civilians have the right to be wrong.[1] Because the elected civilian power has its responsibility and would be held accountable for its voters. These aforementioned assumptions are the reference points of civil-military relations in a democratic state, which are approved by the international society.

Military Interventions in the West

The US and Europe, the paper figures of the West, have been the main source of the current assumptions of the civil-military relations in the international system. Although the West have the determinants of civil-military relations, it also faced the coups in the past. In Europe, for example, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have witnessed military coups that led to the overthrow elected governments. In France, four generals attempted a coup against Charles De Gaulle on 21 April 1961 and two of them were arrested as a result of this unsuccessful attempt. There were 11 military coups in Greece between 1831 and 1967. Greece was also ruled by the military junta between 1967-74. General Franco in Spain and the Salazar government in Portugal remained in power for years after the military coup. Besides, Italian Colonel Junio Borghese attempted a failed coup against his government in 1964 as well.

While Europe is struggling with the military coups within its borders, the US not having faced a military coup for 100 years took an active role in many cross-border military coups. According to William Bum, the US has attempted to overthrow more than fifty governments, most of which were democratically elected, and grossly interfered in democratic elections in at least thirty countries since 1945.[2]

Coups in Turkey

1960 — The first coup in the history of the Republic of Turkey.

1971 — Interim intervention

1980 — Conflicts between right and left groups increased

1997 — The military authorities put pressure on the Prime Minister at the National Security Council.

Intervention Attempts in the 2000s

2007 — E-memorandum

2016 — July 15, coup d'état attempt

The western norms claim that "the quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments." According to European Security Strategy declaration, having been adopted by the European Council in 2003, the best protection for European security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening international order.[3]

Besides, the National Security Strategy document of the USA clearly emphasizes that "the USA will advance its influence, because a world to support the American interests and reflect its values makes America more secure and prosperous." According

to National Security Strategy, America's commitment to liberty, democracy, and the rule of law serves as an inspiration for those living under tyranny.[4] The US encourages those who want to join their community of like-minded democratic states and improve the condition of their peoples.[5]

Although the discourses of Europe and the US on consolidation and promotion of democracy are similar; their behavior patterns are different. While the US does not hesitate to use the option of military power for the democracy promotion as we have observed in the case of Iraq in 2003, the EU conditions democratic institutions on the candidates and recommends specially for the 'periphery' countries.

Although the EU does not have a formal criteria for the civil-military relations, the Union declares that stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy is one of the main criteria for the full membership in the European integration.[6] Therefore, establishing civilian control over the military is considered essential for the political stability of the EU members as a whole. The Copenhagen Criteria simply expresses some basic principles of democracy for the accession and obliges the adoption of the EU's acquis communautaire which consists of off EU rules and regulations.[7] EU adoption process led to a western model of civil-military relations, under which the armed forces are subjected the full civilian control. At this point, the democracy pressure of the European Union has accelerated the constitutional transformation of the candidate countries, especially in civilian military relations.

In this context, the issue of Turkey's EU membership has been the motivation and justification for breaking the military's political autonomy. Turkey has carried out remarkable legal reforms in civil-military relations after 1999 which can be divided into "EU-motivated" and "self-motivated" periods.

A Brief History of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

In Anatolia, the tension between civilian powers and military bureaucracy has a long history from the Ottoman Empire to the present. At least twelve of the thirty-six Ottoman sultans were replaced by military intervention. In the period of the Republic of Turkey, the civil power had been exposed to four military coups and at least two coup attempts. After each coup, the military consolidated its political autonomy and built autonomous areas.

For example, after the coup of 12 September 1980, 669 new laws were enacted in many areas such as political parties, judiciary system, state of emergency law, local governments, universities, TRT, associations, trade unions, professional organizations, freedom of press, and right to collective bargaining.[8] Turkey's constitutional system was restructured with the aforementioned rules within a strict approach. The military coups in Turkey have caused a serious socio-psychological impact on young generations and demolished the image of Turkey in international society.

Because of the military hegemony, the governments in Turkey had to constantly pay regard to the political autonomy of the military in their decision making process, especially after the coups in 1960 and 1980. For this reason, the political elite who wanted to get rid of the political autonomy of the

military, struggled to reorganize the legal regulations accordingly in 2000's.

This struggle could be handle the wave of reforms undertaken by the civil power in three periods. Turkey's first initiative was done with the motivation of the EU membership in 1999 and 2005. The second wave of reforms were carried out by Turkey's self-proclaimed dynamics after 2007 against e-memorandum. And the third one came after the July 15 coup attempt in the context of civil-military relations.

EU-Motivated Reforms in Turkey's Civil-Military Relations between 1999 and 2005

Turkey initiated an EU-norms-centered reform dynamism both to reduce military pressure on political area and to be participated in the West's so-called democratic league. During this period, the EU's "open-ended" accession process has ensured a new orientation of the Turkish foreign policy beyond the borders and also established legitimacy of the political power.

First Wave of the Reforms

With the first wave reforms carried out in 1999-2005, the composition of the National State Council (NSC), which played a key role in the military intervention in politics, was changed in favor of civilians. By this way, a civilian-centered NSC was formed and tasks of NSC were redetermined in accordance with the democratic criteria. The military judge in the State Security Court was terminated, and the arrangement led to the establishment of a civilian state security court.[9] In addition, the military courts' ability to judge civilians has been restricted with the the Seventh Harmonization Package in 2003. In this period, it can be said that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has maintained its successors EU motivation and believed the possibility of a EU membership if Turkey could bear EU's political reforms.[10]

Self-Proclaimed Reforms in Turkey's Civil-Military Relations from 2005 to Present

The relations between the EU and Turkey have gradually deteriorated due to the EU's concerns after 2006. Particularly, the possibility of Turkey's EU membership has alarmed Turcophobic anxieties and some leading EU countries like France and Germany have started to block Turkey's membership process by offering alternative models and obstructing acquis communautaire. All these conditions have enabled Turkey to actualize some constitutional reforms with its own dynamics regarding the civilian and military relations.

Second Wave of the Reforms

The e-memorandum crisis was an important breaking point for the second wave reforms. On 27 April 2007, General Staff released a statement on its website which sent a harsh warning to the government about the presidential elections. In response to these statements, government spokesman Cemil Çiçek said that "It is unthinkable for the General Staff to publish a statement against the government in a democratic state.."[11] Following the e-memorandum crisis in 2007, "the second wave" reforms were carried out through a referendum held on 12 September 2010. The referendum paved the way for a constitutional amendment abolishing the amnesty article. This in turn led to the trial of two of the 1980 coup leaders in 2012.[12] By this way, one of the most significant and contentious amendments of referendum was the abolishment of Article 15[13] from the constitution, which banned the prosecution of the 1980 coup leaders, and thus had served as an exit guarantee in the form of an amnesty law for the military. For many years, Article 15 was a symbol of the political immunity of the military, and the resilience of military preferences in national policy.[14] Also the EMASYA Protocol, which authorized the intervention of the military in social events, was abolished. The constitutional amendment of 2010 allowed military officers to face trials in civilian courts for criminal offenses against state security.

In democratic regimes, parliaments control oversight of the budget after its adoption by taking help from independent institutions such as the Court of Accounts. The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey makes the Court of Accounts (CoA) responsible for auditing, on behalf of parliament, all the accounts relating to the revenue, expenditure and property of state institutions. However, in practice, the CoA had been exempted from auditing the military's assets for many years due to the CoA Law adoption in 1960. With the referandum, The new CoA Law (No. 6085) abolished the CoA's obligation to get parliament's request before auditing state institutions.[15] Thus, the CoA was given authority to start its investigations without seeking parliament's permission. The amendment have given the Court of Accounts to monitor budget of the armed forces in 2010.

Besides, in 2010, the referendum allowed the officers to be tried in civilian instead of military courts for criminal offenses against state security and the constitutional order. Thus, military jurisdiction was only obliged to proceed of the crimes committed by the military.

According to the Paragraph 2 of Article 125 of the Constitution: "The acts of the President of the Republic on his or her own competence, and the decisions of the Supreme Military Council are outside the scope of judicial review." The referendum has changed this judicial immunity and opened the decisions of the Supreme Military Council regarding expulsion from the Armed Forces to judicial review.[16]

Third Wave of the Reforms

The coup attempt on July 15, 2016 has compelled the third wave of reforms in the field of civil-military relations in Turkey. According to Muhittin Ataman, who is one of the Turkish political science scholars, "July 15" was different in many aspects from previous coup attempts. The reason behind the above mentioned coups (i.e. 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997) was always related with the "protection of the secular principles" of the Turkish Republic. The agents that undertook the coup attempt of July 15 were different; it was masterminded by a civil group. The tools used and the targets of the plotters were also divergent when compared with the earlier coups. The coup plotters of July 15 not only targeted the politicians and the governmental institutions, but they also did not even spare the life of the innocent civilians who took to the streets to protect their democratically elected government.[17] Unlike other coups, the July 15 coup attempt was unsuccessful thanks to the resistance of

The July 15 was different in many aspects from previous coup attempts.

the Turkish people. A total of 249 people were martyred and 2.195 were wounded in the bloodiest attempt. The failure of the coup proved two important dynamics of Turkey. The first one is the existence of the Turkish society as a prohibiting power against the coups anymore. And the second one is that the Turkish people can unite under a single flag, leaving aside their differences. The "July 15" was a rare case where the people can push down bottom-up a military coup attempt.

After the July 15 coup attempt, the civilian political authority declared a state of emergency on 20 July 2016 and introduced various legal arrangements in civil-military relations. The amendments that have been carried out within Turkish Military Force (TSK) following coup attempt, emphasis on the meeting of Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura) on 28 July 2016 and the Degrees (KHK's) of 27 July, 31 July, 2 September, 7 September, and 6 January 2017 have been the government's largest legal action against the military uprising.[18]

With the state of emergency decree laws, the Turkish army will be subjected to a series of changes in a number of fields, including military education, structure of Supreme Military Council (YAŞ), health institutions, services commands, and reforms in the military-government relationship.

As part of the passed decree law the Land Forces, Naval Forces and Air Force commands came under the control of the Ministry of National Defense, while the president and the prime minister will have the authority to receive direct information and issue force commanders direct orders that will be executed immediately without

the need of approval from another post. Besides, the Defense Ministry has been tasked with executing all administrative aspects of the institutions.[19] The military promotion and appointment system have changed with the executive decree of No. 681 and officers' promotion starting from the rank of lieutenant submitted under the authority of the Defense Minister which had been done by the Turkish General Staff. With the Decree Law No. 668, the authorization to establish and remove the Military Courts was granted to the Ministry of National Defense.[20] The Gendarmerie General Command and Coast Guard Command were also brought under the Interior Ministry.

The structure of YAŞ was changed in favour of civilians and several top cabinet ministers have had seats according to the decree law. The amendment meant that a number of military officers could no longer sit on the council, including some generals and admirals.[21] The defense minister also replaced the deputy chief of the general staff as the council's secretary-general.

Military schools had closed down and National Defense University established which was expected to become an umbrella body encompassing all other educational institutions of the Turkish Army. Within the formation of the university, all current military academies were closed and all military education administered through the newly formed institution.[22] Thus, it was aimed to establish more civilian education at the undergraduate and graduate level with a new curriculum.[23]

As part of the decree law No. 669, the Gülhane Military Medical Academy (GATA)

and other military hospitals were brought under the control of the Health Ministry. Accordingly, GATA-linked teaching hospitals, Turkish Armed Forces Rehabilitation Care Center, military hospitals, dispensaries and similar health service units and health institutions belonging to the Gendarmerie General Command were transferred to the Health Ministry along with their rights and obligations, dues and debts, and contracts and commitments.

After the government reforms in February 2017, the Muslim headscarf ban on Turkish female army officers was lifted and women could wear the headscarf underneath their cap or beret as long as it is the same colour as their uniform. Women soldiers in Turkey could be able to wear a headscarf as part of their uniforms.[24]

The democracy is not only a concept or a method for governing, but it is also a declaration of a league in the international system today.

Conclusion and Suggestions

In this new speed era where all concepts are revised, there are certain constants such as the ideal of democracy. Democracy is not only a concept or a method for governing, but it is also a declaration of a league in the international system today. However, there are certain principles for a sustainable democracy, one of which is the superiority of civilian in civil–military relations and the army's loyalty to the elected political decision-maker.

The main objective in civil-military relations is to capture a "golden ratio" between maintaining a strong army, capable of defending the country against external

threats, and establishing the sustainable democratic institutions. Narcís Serra, one of the leading thinkers of the civil-military relations literature, defines three important axes for transition periods of democratic consolidation. According to Serra, the military reform cannot be isolated from democratic reform, society should operate as a third front in legitimate transition, and military's political autonomy should be restricted especially on legal grounds. Serra underlines that efforts must be made in both civil and military arenas simultaneously.[25] Democratization process should not be exclusively for military reforms, but must have a holistic approach. This means that a reform process only focusing on civilian-military relations would fail. In addition, Serra emphasizes the Ministry of Defense should have a broad authority and civilian defence ministers must have mandates that are as extended as possible. The short-lived nature of ministerial post is the biggest obstacle to execute major reforms.[26]

Besides, as Rebecca Schiff points out, the relationship between civil and military institutions is not enough to explain the dynamic interactions between the political,

The sources of military coups should also be examined in the cultural codes of a givensociety.

military and social sectors of society. The policy-makers should take the indigenous conditions and complexities of different nations into account. According to her theory, the mutual accommodation and communication channels between the army, civilian elite and society must be constantly open. The Condordance theory highlights that dialogue, accommodation, and shared values have key role in context of objectives between the military, the political elites, and society. According to Schiff, if the civilian elite, army, and the society are able to achieve a strong concordance about the role of the armed forces, then, the domestic military intervention is less likely to occur in a particular state.[27] Therefore, the sources of military coups should also be examined in the cultural codes of a given society. Because of the incidental coups and coup attempts, it is not possible to say that there is no more threat of coup in Turkey. In this context, it is possible to say that the asymmetric hierarchy between the army and the people in a country is one of the main causes of the military coup. Therefore, reducing the distance between society and army might have a key role for Turkey's civil-military relations.

End Notes

1   Peter Douglas Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23, No.2 (1996): 154.

2   William Blum, *America's Deadliest Export: Democracy-The Thurt about US Foreign Policy and Everything Else* (New York: Zed Books, 2013): 16.

3   European Council, "European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World," *EU Global Strategy* Brussels (2003): 10.

4   United States, "*The national security strategy of the United States of America*," Washington (2017): 5.

5   *Ibid.*

6   "Conditions for Membership." European Commission. Accessed October 2, 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en

7   European Union Center of North Carolina, "European Union Integration & Civil-Military Relations", EU Briefings, (2007): s.1

8   Ergun Özbudun, *Çağdaş Türk Politikası: Demokratik Pekişmenin Önündeki Engeller* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005): p. 72.

9   The State Security Courts were abolished in 2004. The abolition of the State Security Courts reduced the military's power to try civilians in military courts.

10   T.C. Başbakanlık, "Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, Avrupa Birliği Uyum Yasa Paketleri," Ankara (2007): 38.

11   "Hükümet Genelkurmay Açıklamasını Değerlendirdi," *Hürriyet*, 28 Nisan 2007

12   Florence Gaub, "Civil-Military Relations in the MENA: Between Fragility And Resilience," *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, Chaillot Papers (2016): p.18.

13   ARTICLE 15- (1) In times of war, mobilization, martial law, (abolished) or a state of emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms may be partially or entirely suspended, or measures derogating the guarantees embodied in the Constitution may be taken to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, as long as obligations under international law are not violated.; "Turkey: Unofficial Translation of the Amendments to the Constitution," *Venice Commission* (2017): p.2. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)005-e

14   Ariana Keyman, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *e-International Relations,* 21 May 2012

15   *Uğur Burç Yıldız, "Rethinking Civil–Militar Relations in Turkey: The Problems of the Democratic Governance of the Defense and Security Sectors," Turkish Studies 15 No.3 (2014): p.9.*

16   *Levent Gönenç, "2010 Proposed Constitutional Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey," Economy Policy Research Foundation of Turkey-TEPAV, Evaluation Note (2010): p.4*

17   *Ed. Muhittin Ataman, July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey: Context, Causes and Consequences (İstanbul: SETA Publications, 2017): p.11.*

18   *Metin Gürcan, "Never Again! But How? State and the Military in Turkey After July 15," İstanbul Policy Center (2017): s.11*

19   *"Turkish gov't introduces new decree law to overhaul army," Hürriyet Daily News, 31 July 2016. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-introduces-new-decree-law-to-overhaul-army--102281*

20   *The Ministry of Justice of Turkey, "The Report for the Visit of Delegation of Venice Commission to Ankara" Strasbourg, (2016): p.67.*

21   *"Turkey: Top ministers to join Supreme Military Council," Anadolu Agency, 31 July 2016. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/turkey-top-ministers-to-join-supreme-military-council/618975*

22   *"President Erdoğan appoints rector to newly-founded National Defense University," Hürriyet Daily News, 5 October 2016. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-appoints-rector-to-newly-founded-national-defense-university-104618*

23   *Metin Gürcan, "Never Again! But How?…", p.11.*

24   *"Turkey permits women soldiers to wear headscarf," Hürriyet Daily News, 22 February 2017. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-permits-women-soldiers-to-wear-headscarf-110035*

25   *Narcis Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010): p. 43.*

26   *Ibid., p.240.*

27   *Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 22, Issue: 1 (1995): 12-13.*

The Ugly Face
of Human Rights in Egypt Today

KADRİYE SINMAZ

W e can name at least two significant issues in the streets of Egypt particularly in the past nine years; they are "social revolution" and "military coup". The overthrow of the 30-year-old Mubarak regime did raise new hopes in the public eye. But the hopes fade in just a blink of the eye. The diversity of the opposition and the involvement of different actors on the regional and global levels quickly changed the destiny of the country. The military, which is strong and effective in the politics in Egypt, overthrew the legitimate government in consequence of a coup on July 3, 2013, and put the country into a new and painful process.

The constitutional amendment that Abdul Fatah El-Sisi brought into the Parliament on February 3, 2013 shows that the coup regime would continue to be repressive. By virtue of article 140 of the regulation, Sisi would remain in the presidency until 2034.[1] The continuation of the status quo in Egypt is a sign that the violation of rights on opposition groups would surely continue. In order to understand the magnitude of the ongoing violations, it is necessary to examine the revolution and coup processes and to acknowledge the types and numbers of violations.

The Processes of Revolution and Military Coup

On December 17, 2010, the Arab Spring begun when a street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself in Tunisia. The rise of the uprisings in Egypt following Bouazizi's death, being a leading and important country, had been a critical development in terms of the circumstances of the region. On January 25, 2011, people took to the streets in Egypt, particularly in Tahrir Square. The uprising in Egypt and the overthrow of the Mubarak regime served as a source of courage and inspiration for the uprising of other countries in the region, such as Yemen and Syria. Socio-economic imbalances and demands for political rights were the two main reasons of the uprisings.

During the demonstrations in Egypt, at least 846 people were killed and more than 6,400 were injured by state-affiliated security forces.[2] Eventually, Hosni Mubarak admitted defeat and resigned on February 11, 2011. However, in the course of 25 January-11 February 2011, there were many violations of the right to live, systematic torture, forced disappearances, and no punishment was given to the perpetrators. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) temporarily took over the government until the democratic transition of the system was achieved.

In June 2012, shortly after the presidential election, elected president Mursi was criticized for not being democratic and being prejudiced, and hence a new wave of demonstrations against Mursi began. During these protests, there were at least 46 cases of sexual assault against women in Tahrir Square. Sadly the Egyptian security forces did not respond to these crimes.

On July 3, 2013, Abdul Fatah El-Sisi, then Chief of staff, seized the control of the government through military coup. Sheikh Ahmed Al-Tayyeb, the grand imam of Al-Azhar, Tawadros II, the leader of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria, the well-known opponents Amr Moussa and Mohamed Al-Baradei and the Nur party supported the coup declaration.

After the coup, two presidential elections were held in 2014 and 2018. Sisi gained 96.7% of the votes in the election held on 26-27 May 2014, with merely 44.4% participation.

In the 2018 election, he eliminated his opponents unlawfully and competed alone in the 41,4% participation election. As easily predicted, he got 97% of the vote.

Right Violations After the Military Coup

Since the time of the the military coup until present, hundreds of human rights violations against different opposition groups such as journalists, lawyers, and non-governmental organizations, especially members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, were done by the Egyptian Government.

After the military coup, thousands of Egyptians demonstrated in Rabia and Nahda squares demanding the reinstatement of Mursi. In a single day, which was August 14, 2013, more than 1,000 people (2,500 according to the Muslim Brotherhood) were killed in Rabia Square, now a symbol of resistance. This bloody day was recorded as the biggest massacre in modern history.

Many human rights organizations, including the Human Rights Watch (HRW), consider this attack as "crimes against humanity" by virtue of article 7 of the United Nations (UN) Rome Statute.[3]

In July 2018, a law approved by the Egyptian parliament prevented the trial of some names that killed the protesters in the demonstrations between July 3, 2013- June 10, 2016.[4] In other words, the opponents were the only disadvantaged party during and after the uprisings. Hundreds of people were arrested in Rabia and many of them were severely punished.[5]

In the following years, the demonstrations held on the anniversary of the revolution and coup went bloody and suppressed by the military regime. With these massacres, the Sisi regime tried to strengthen its authority

in the country and terrorize the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups. The politics of the Sisi regime have led to many bloody actions by extremist militarist groups in the country.

A large number of people were detained in the streets and universities as a result of belonging to different opposition groups; these people – in which some were anti-regime human rights activists and some from the media - were then used to blackmail the oppositions in July 2013. These people were detained for days, months, and most of them were tortured, without any justification, similar to the Mubarak era. Some of the detainees were taken to off-record detention centers and interrogated without any official records. Many people died due to torture during formal or informal interrogations.

According to unofficial figures, there are currently 60,000 prisoners in Egyptian prisons. Some are systematically tortured and subjected to sexual violence. Egypt has signed UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment that prohibits torture. Conversely, according to the statements of the victims of torture, there are different forms of torture, such as beating in prisons, electrocution, rape, harassment and psychological torture. The Egyptian government has repeatedly rejected requests of examination in the prisons and detention centers by the UN Committee Against Torture and other international organizations. In the committee's report in June 2017, it was concluded that torture in Egypt is a systematic practice based on the statements of the victims.[6]

More than 250 people were sexually assaulted between November 2012 and January 2014 in Egypt.[7] The actual figures on this issue cannot be estimated because government officials restrict in-prison observation. However, it is believed that the number is higher than predicted.

After the coup, the court produced many death sentences. According to the Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR), at least 2.532 death penalties were made in criminal and political cases in military and civilian courts between 2013-2018. At least 165 people have been executed in this period.[8] Egypt became the third country with the highest death penalty in 2017. It ranked sixth in the list of counties with most death penalties. Nine young people between ages of 20 and 30, who were accused for the assassination of the Chief Prosecutor Hisham Barakat in 2015, were executed in February 2019.[9]

document 1.520 of them, given access to resources is limited.[10]

Sisi's repressive policies have also affected the media. Television broadcasts and social media began to be controlled by intelligence units. Restrictions on the Internet and social networks have been introduced. More than 500 websites have been blocked since the summer of 2017, and a large number of people have been detained because of their social media posts. According to the law adopted in 2018, a personal social media account, blog or website with more than 5,000 followers will be subject to the media

One of the most important methods used to subdue the opponents is "forced disappearances". Accordingly, the officials working under the government can detain persons without an arrest warrant. The duration of forced disappearances varies from a few days to seven months. Egyptian Rights and Freedoms Coordination (ECRF), a non-governmental organization based in Cairo, announced that more than 10,000 cases of forced disappearances have taken place from 2013 to 2018. However, they could only

laws.[11] Egypt ranks 163 in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index. Today, approximately 20 journalists are being held in Egyptian prisons.[12]

The operation "Sinai 2018", launched on February 9, 2018, also increased the violations of the public's basic rights. Civilians were killed in the attacks by state-affiliated forces and militarist groups. The operation also used cluster bombs, which is banned under international law.[13]

According to the official spokesman of the armed forces, 389 civilians were killed by illegal armed forces, while other internal forces have also murdered 109 other civilians in 2018 alone. According to Egypt's Ministry of Interior, last year the Egyptian police have killed 271 civilians (144 in North Sinai and 127 in other regions).[14] So just in 2018, a total of 828 people were killed in different ways in Egypt. During the operations, hundreds of hectares of agricultural land were also destroyed by the Egyptian army and at least 3,000 homes and commercial buildings were destroyed.[15]

Still in 2018, there were at least 5.418 violations of human rights, including arbitrary arrest, killing, torture, death, executions and forced disappearances.[16]

Conclusion and Recommendations

Western countries pride themselves as those who emphasize the importance of certain concepts such as democracy, freedom and justice on every platform. But the irony lies on the fact that they have not imposed any sanction in regards to the human rights violations of the coup regime in Egypt. Even more so, those countries have been in cooperation with the coup regime. Such that, just after the execution of the nine young people in Egypt, EU member states attended the Sharm el Sheikh meeting.

The United States has shown a partial reaction to violations of rights in the Obama era, but President Donald Trump clearly supported Sisi's coup regime. In return of the political and economic support of the United States, the Sisi regime stayed silent for the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and the US' recognition of the Golan Heights as the land of Israel. It also maintains its diplomatic relations with Israel at a high level.

The military coup regime has been receiving financial support from the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since the beginning of the regime's establishment.

Turkey has always been against the coup in Egypt. Although economic relations between the two countries continue, diplomatic relations have broken off. The Syrian crisis, the Eastern Mediterranean energy resources sharing and the violations of the rights of the opponents in the Sisi regime are the reasons for the continuation of tensions between the two countries.

In order to achieve a normal and humane state in Egypt, rights violations must be recognized in the international system before all else. International organizations and other countries should not ignore the rights violations of thousands of people simply for their political interests.

Violations in military operations in Sinai and all interventions that killed civilians must be stopped. Tortures and sexual assaults in prisons and detention centers must also be stopped, and the necessary medical treatment should be provided to ill prisoners.

During the trial, international and national laws should be respected. Military courts should never be used on civilians. Forced disappearances and arbitrary arrests must be stopped. The aftermath of persons who have been subjected to violations before should be shared with their families.

Those who are responsible for the violations of rights, such as killing, torture, injuries, sexual violence, especially in the Rabia massacre, should be held accountable and punished in courts. The Egyptian government should accept the proposals for international investigation of allegations of fundamental human rights violations in Egypt.

End Notes

1 "Sisi'nin görev süresini uzatacak Anayasa değişikliği", *AA*, 05.02.2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/sisinin-gorev-suresini-uzatacak-anayasa-degisikligi-/1384079

2 "Egypt unrest: 846 killed in protests-official toll", *BBC*, 19.04.2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13134956

3 "All According to Plan: The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killing of Protestors in Egypt", HRW, 12.08.2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt#page

4 "Egypt passes law that could shield top military brass from prosecution", *Reuters*, 16.07.2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN1K62JP?fee

5 Kahire Ceza Mahkemesi 14 Ağustos 2013'te Rabia Meydanı'nda oturma eylemine katıldıkları için 739 kişi hakkında adil olmayan bir şekilde toplu yargılama yaptı. Mahkeme, 75 kişinin idamına, 47 kişinin 25 yıl, 22'si çocuk olmak üzere 612 kişinin de 5 yıldan 15 yıla kadar hapsine karar verdi.

6 *The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),* A/72/44, paragraf: 58, 2017, http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=-dtYoAzPhJ4NMy4Lu1TOebJtOzHl9Ya%2bxza%2bE%2b-vtPfEMjvoay0x2iV30x2zj4TLGEMjRXVex9Q%2fNhn-R3%2fZHIww27bw4ZF3htxFLucJ9b7NxE%3d

7 "Egypt: Epidemic of sexual violence continues", Worldwide Movement for Human Rights (FIDH), 16.04.2014, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/north-africa-middle-east/egypt/15140-egypt-epidemic-of-sexual-violence-continues

8 "Executions in Egypt: July 2013- December 2018", Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR), Cenevre, 14.02.2019, https://egyptianfront.org/statments/joint-statement/in-a-joint-report-regarding-executions-in-egypt-three-independent-organizations-call-on-egyptian-authorities-to-establish-a-moratorium-on-executions/

9 "Mısır'da 9 Kişi İdam Edildi", *BBC*, 21.02.2019, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-47313908

10 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018: Egypt,* US Department of State Diplomacy in Action, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2018&dlid=289203

11 "Egypt to regulate popular social media users", *BBC*, 17.07.2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44858547

12 *Reporters without Borders: Egypt*, https://rsf.org/en/egypt

13 *Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2018.*

14 "Parmaklıklar Ülkesi: Mısır 2018 İnsan Hakları Raporu", İNSAMER, 04.04.2019, https://insamer.com/tr/parmakliklar-ulkesi-misir-2018-insan-haklari-raporu_2035.html

15 *World Report 2019*, HRW, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/egypt

16 "Inhumanity Human Rights…", s. 5.

Sudanese Limbo
in the Transition Period

SERHAT ORAKÇI

2019/2

33 | Inter Notional

S udanese uprising and its aftermath military-involvement into politics by coup d'état remind us of a pendulum model which African scholar Ali Mazrui used to imagine a condition for post-colonial African state. Mazrui described African state in a situation moving on the polars of two important pendulums: tiding between military led-government and civilian government; and between single-party system and multi-party system. When we look at the political history of Sudan after 1956 Mazrui's explanation sheds some light on a vicious circle that repeat itself perfectly. For that it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that history is recurring in Sudan.

The protests that started in the last days of 2018 finally reached an important turn on Thursday, April 11th 2019. By besieging the presidential palace, the army seized the control of the government in the early hours of the day. Omar Al-Bashir, who has been in power for 30 years, finally admitted defeat and resigned. Because of these latest developments, an era officially came to an end in Sudan. Without a doubt, the developments that took place after December 19th were determinant in the process.

The protests initially started in Atbara, a city in the north of Sudan, on December 19th 2018 due to an abnormal rise in the price of bread. However, the protests spread over the country, turned political and people started to demand for the resignation of Omar Al-Bashir. The government responded the protest with force, and claiming that Israel played a role in the uprising and then pointed their finger to the communist groups. Civilian casualties only turned the protests to grow even bigger. And this had led human rights movements such as the Human Rights Watch (HRW) to condemn the violence against the peaceful protestors by publishing various reports.

Realizing that he had to do something to protect his power, Omar Al-Bashir organized openings and support rallies by visiting various cities of the country. However, his efforts weren't enough to put an end to the ongoing protests. The people of Sudan could not accept the forced entrances to houses, torture on people and the fact that security forces under the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) used real bullets to disperse the protestors. Al-Bashir's soft diplomacy on the people he hurt simply did not work.

The Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) as the organizer of the protests was able to bring together the entire anti-regime groups and parties under the same roof. SPA successfully united Sufi-based political parties, such as the National Umma Party, which represents the Islamic wing of the country, with political figures such as Mu'tamar Al-Sudani, which have secular ideologies under "The Declaration of Freedom and Change". All of these different groups were united under the principles of forcing Omar Al-Bashir to resign, founding a transitional government with the leadership of an impartial and trustworthy leader and transitioning the country into a democratic order.

Omar Al-Bashir still tried to take some precautions following the developments, he discharged the whole government, claiming that they were unable to put an end to the protests and he also declared martial law for one year. Al-Bashir founded the new government with people whom he trusted and those with military reputations; he conferred the position of chairperson of the party to Ahmad Haroun. Even with the implications that Al-Bashir won't be able to participate in the upcoming elections once his period of office ends in 2020, and despite the harsh punishments on the unauthorized protests and marches, the protests continued. In the meantime, the parliament reduced the duration of the martial law to 6 months. The

protestors, who used the "freedom, justice and peace" slogan didn't refrain from mentioning the cases of corruptions that were carried out by people most of whom were in office. After four months of grueling developments, Sudan finally reached a significant turning point in history.

The main goal of the protests, strikes and sit-in protests that were carried out under the "Declaration of Freedom and Change", was to force president Omar Al-Bashir to resign and to call for the transition the government into a participatory one. The protestors, who previously organized the protests separately in various locations for the last 4 months, decided to unite when they started a sit-in protest in front of the Ministry of Justice of Sudan on April 6th, 2019. This tactic was interpreted that the protests organizers and the anti-government army group were somehow related. During the sit-in protests in which lots of people participated, the people and the army appeared to be at peace with one another. This is evident because even when the police under the NISS tried to disperse the crowd three times they failed due to the army's response to the attempts. This partial intimacy between the people and the army then led to several fights on a small scale that took place between the army and the security units that were connected to the intelligence services. In the events that have been taking place since April 6th, 21 people (5 of which were soldiers) lost their lives.

After fights between groups that happened since April 6th, some government officials indicated the dispersion of protests by making harsh statements on the issue; where it was announced that a protest was to be organized by the supporters of Al-Bashir. Following the news about buses carrying armed forces from outside of Khartoum were caught in the city borders, combats started to take place in the country after midnight. The news on TV and radio stations of how the army sieged the presidential palace on April 11th at 06.30 changed the whole situation in the country.

It seems that an era had came to an end in Sudan with this military action. The events that happened in Sudan are similar with the ones that took place in 1964 and 1985. The intense public protests that started due to the economic problems ended single party military administrations of Ibrahim Abboud in 1964 and Gaafar Nimeiry in 1985 and later paved the way for civilian governments under multi-party system. It is almost like a historical deja vu is taking place in Sudan. In the new term, the transitional government will shape the politics. However, the platforms and political formations of the protests demand for the administration to turn into a civil administration as soon as possible via transitional road map. So far, the dialogue taken place between new military council and civil actors have not produced a solution. Mazrui's pendulum is on its way tiding once again. It seems that the outcome of the dialogue process and military council's final decision to deliver the power to civilian hand are main determinants today.

At this point, it is paramount to provide order in the country in the shortest term before any kind of disorder or a civil war breaks out. All actors in Sudan need to make moves with great caution in such a period of time when many Arab countries are experiencing various civil wars.

All actors in Sudan need to make moves with great caution in such a period of time when many Arab countries are experiencing various civil wars.

The crisis of democracy in Algeria;
Why was the "Arab Spring" stumbled there?

DJALLEL KHECHİB

One year remains to the forthcoming presidential elections in Algeria, and the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is still the candidate of the "majority of political elites" in the country, as his supporters claim, those who are still nominate the same man for taking the fifth consecutive presidential mandate in spite of his severe illness which threw him on his wheelchair since five years ago. In contrast, the current Algerian political arena is unable to find an alternative consensus candidate, the case that raises many questions about the democratic future of a country with the characteristics of an entire continent.

This article discusses the underlying causes behind the democratic deficit in Algeria, which political regime remains firmly in place despite all the waves of "democratic chaos" sweeping its regional sphere since 2011 or the so-called "Arab spring revolutions". So, we would like to ask the following questions: What prevents the political change in Algeria towards democracy? How did the political regime in Algeria prevent the arrival of democratic waves of change to the borders of Algeria?

This article is divided into two parts, the first part provides a brief story of the historical path that democracy has taken in Algeria since independence, explaining the effective actors in the Algerian political regime, while the second part is trying to identify the most important factors that cause the continuation of the democratic deficit in Algeria until now, wondering about the future of democracy in the country rich in natural wealth, people capacities and great history.

How did the political regime in Algeria prevent the arrival of democratic waves of change to the borders of Algeria?

A Brief Story of Democracy in Algeria

Before we identify the causes of the democratic deficit in Algeria in general and the factors that caused the failure of the "Arab Spring" in the country in particular, it is better to give the reader a brief history of the democratic experiment in Algeria. After gaining independence from the French occupiers in 1962, Algeria took a socialist way for the economy and policy of state under the leadership of the late revolutionary leader Houari Boumediene, who came to power after a coup d'état on his friend in revolution the late Ahmed Ben Bella in 1965, or what is so-called by "revolutionary correction".

Algeria was governed by Boumediene until his death in December 1978, during his term, the country had a very good reputation on the international level, Algeria was a leading voice of the national liberation movements and an influential leader in the non-aligned movement in the Third World, and its diplomacy was characterized by unprecedented activity with its repeated successes in the mediation process among disputed parties.

At the domestic level, Boumediene devoted national reforms of a socialist nature, such as the nationalization of fuel, the agricultural revolution that succeeded to some extent in pushing this young country's economy forward, but its policies failed miserably to construct a state with strong institutions which its continuity was not dependent on the presence and continuity of any leader in ruling as he used to say. Boumediene is also blamed on integrating some Algerian officers in the national military who had fought against the Algerian liberation revolution alongside

with France and joined the revolution later on, called the "Lacoste promotion". He did not know at the time that this military group would shape the future of Algeria after him.

After the death of President Boumediene in 1978, political influence of the military establishment grew, this establishment brought the late Shadli Ben Jadid as a new president of Algeria, by marginalizing more experienced and famous political figures than Ben Jadid like Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was the Algerian foreign minister during the days of Boumediene and was close to him or Mr. Mohamed Saleh Yahiaoui, which was a very revolutionary charismatic personality. The days of Shadli Ben Jedid (1979-1992) were characterized by numerous political and social disturbances, the most important were the events of "the Amazigh Spring" in 1980, which the Amazigh demanded some political and social rights which were denied during Boumedian term. The country also witnessed a growing wave of Islamic trends and movements, which was inspired by The Muslim Brotherhood ideas in Egypt, the Islamic revolution ideas in Iran, the Wahhabi trend of Saudi Arabia, the jihadist ideas of Afghanistan and others. The Algerian economy has also been known to severely deteriorate due to the collapse of oil price at $8 per barrel. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the triumph of Western liberalism, there was no longer any justification for the ruling elite in Algeria to continue adopting the socialist system in economy and governance. The new international circumstances have led Algeria toward liberalism and democratic openness. Despite all the political and social problems that the country was experiencing at that time, but it did not shake the confidence

> *After the death of President Boumediene in 1978, political influence of the military establishment was grew.*

of the Algerian ruling party (FLN) in itself, nor the confidence of ruling Generals from behind the curtain in opening the country's door to political pluralism and allowing other new formed parties to compete for power. So, the 1992 legislative elections were a decisive turning point in Algeria's modern history.

In 1992, an Islamist-oriented political front called "The Islamic Salvation Front" (FIS) was able to defeat the ruling party in a legislative election that everyone saw as fair. At that time, President Shadli announced his acceptance with respect of the results of the fund. However, this was not accepted by "Les décideurs" (The main decision-makers) in Algeria, as they were named. They pushed Shadli to resign and tanks came to the street to restore the situation to what it was before, that caused the failure of the first democratic experience in Algeria and plunging the country into a period of terrible violence and terrorism. The Algerian Generals sought refuge in the revolutionary leader Mohamed Boudiaf, who enjoyed his revolutionary legitimacy and was also accepted by the Algerian political community. He was pushed to power, but Boudiaf did not rule for more than five months (January–June 1992) as he was assassinated while addressing the Algerian people in a live broadcast, and until now the circumstances of his assassination remain ambiguous. Many analysts say that the man was a victim of his attempts to restore power and put it in the hands of civilians rather than military. After his assassination, Algeria entered terrible years of random violence and terror throughout the 1990s or what the Algerians know as the era of "black decade". At that time, Algeria was ruled by two successive presidents, namely Ali Kafi (1992-1994) and Liamine

Zeroual (1994-1999). Both were candidates from the military establishment; the first one recognized his inability to challenge the army, while the second (Zeroual) tried hard to challenge the army, and restore the power to the presidential establishment, but he failed at the end and did not even complete his presidential mandate under the pressure of military in 1999, the same year Bouteflika returned to the Algerian political arena as the candidate of military as well, to begin a new era in Algeria's contemporary political history.

President Bouteflika started his era with the project of civil accord and national reconciliation, ending a decade of massacres and crimes that killed more than 200,000 Algerians, according to official statistics. Although the military establishment stood behind Bouteflika's arrival in Algeria in 1999, the man followed a long-term strategy to restore the power of the presidency and to determine the strength of the military establishment. When we talk about the military establishment we are actually talking about two main bodies that the balance of power and interest between them had made the Algerian presidents since the death of President Boumediene in 1978, they are, the Army's General Staff, led now by General Al-Kayed Saleh, and the Intelligence Agency, which was led by General Mohamed Madin, who is called General Toufik about 25 years ago.

We can say that Bouteflika succeeded to some extent in exploiting this competition between the two bodies so as to increase the power and influence of the presidency, and after benefiting from its support together during the mantades of his reign from 1999 to 2009, the man wanted after the end of his second mandate to amend the Algerian constitution to become more than two mandates, The intelligence sevice refused to do so, but he was supported by the army's chief of staff.

From that period on, Bouteflika's struggle with the intelligence service, supported by the army's chief of staff, began until he was able to dismiss many generals, including the director of intelligence himself, General Al-Tawfik, in 2015, and he appointed another who was close to him, hence benefiting from the support of the two bodies combined. Also, he made some generals close to him and promoted many military leaders to "the rank of General" so as to weaken this rank and break the monopoly of generals opposing him which enjoyed many powers alone.

Bouteflika ended his third mandate in 2014, to re-run for a fourth mandate and win despite his severe illness. Since then, his eloquent speeches and media presence have disappeared due to illness, giving way to an old-new figure who runs the country behind the scenes, his brother Said Bouteflika. Many observers argue that Said Bouteflika is considered the most powerful person in the presidency today, running his brother's functions informally and effectively, relying on the support of the army's chief of staff on the one hand and some of businessmen who are working under the umbrella of the Forum of Heads of Algerian Institutions led by Algerian businessman Ali Haddad, the biggest supporter of Bouteflika's brother, until the cocaine incident occurred, where the balances and alliances within the Algerian regime changed again.

> *If we would like to shorten the nature of the Algerian political system in one term, the term oligarchy will seem to be the closest term to the content.*

If we would like to shorten the nature of the Algerian political system in one term, the term oligarchy will seem to be the closest term to the content. The country is not driven by a single power but by a group of powers or balances or wings, so, the political decision is ultimately an outcome of the struggle and clash among these interests, a game in which each party has relied on an external support. France and the United States stand at the head of these supporters.

One year before the next election, and the current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika is still a candidate for most of these forces, despite the regime figures out that Bouteflika is unable to perform his duties naturally because of his disease, and no one knows until now what the conflict of interests and wings within the Algerian regime will produce, especially after the cocaine issue.

The Roots of Democratic Deficit in Algeria, Why the Arab Spring stopped at the Border?

In 2011, the first waves of the so-called "Arab Spring" exploded in Tunisia, followed by a major crisis in Libya, in which the ruling regime fell. Libya became a failing state, exporting many security problems to its regional environment. Thus, Algeria's borders became surrounded by a fence of crises (Tunisian revolution, a failing state in Libya, security problems coming from Mali, and then the political crisis with Morocco because of the Western Sahara dilemma). However, despite this security-strained regional environment, the Algerian regime has managed to overcome the "chaos of the Arab Spring" and thereby maintain itself adapting to the status quo, and also was able to silence popular political and social

demands. Therefore, many have asked the same question: Why did the "Arab Spring Wave" stop on the Algerian borders? And why Algeria continues to live a democratic deficit, despite all the human and material potential which possesses as a rich country.

We argue here that the factors of the "Arab Spring" failure in Algeria and the reasons of the democratic deficit in the country are considered compound reasons and factors, some of them are related to the people, some of them to the political regime and some of them to the main external factors. In the following, we will explain all of these factors one by one.

The Political Culture of Algerian People

What we mean by the political culture of people is a set of values, perceptions, feelings and ideas accumulated throughout history that the individuals of society believe about the prevailing political concepts, such as their perception of state, the political system, the ruling, political parties and the like so, these perceptions and ideas guiding their political behaviors, especially in the country's major political events. As for the democratic political culture of the Algerian people, we can say that is a very modern culture. This country has not seen the wave of democracy until the end of the last century. The culture of power rotation is a culture that is not deeply rooted in the general public, the general public still believes in "the right man in the right place", and until now, a large group of Algerians is still nostalgic for the days of the late President Houari Boumediene as a purely patriotic man who died and had nothing in his bank account from the people's money than those who came after him "as they think." The Algerian people still believe in the idea of "the savior" and it has not yet a serious sense of the importance of institutions, and of course, we are not talking about the political elites who already believe in democracy even in terms of its form only.

The Historical Memory of "The Black Decade"

The painful memory of "the black decade" is still present in the collective imagination of the Algerian people. Human rights agencies have recorded more than 200,000 deaths, according to official statistics, and about 500,000 deaths, according to unofficial statistics. There are many shocking stories of bloody nights in many villages over Algeria, as in the case of "Ben Talha" village, where unknown gunmen have destroyed an entire village in few hours, leaving about 400 dead. With the outbreak of the "Arab Spring uprisings," the political regime deliberately broadcasted horrible scenes of that era on public television provoking widespread discontent among the Algerians who accused the regime of trying to terrorize the Algerians so that no one would dare to "rebel" again, and support for this "chaos movement" which called "Arab spring." As if the political regime is addressing the people saying: Either us or bloody chaos.

The Military Nature of the Algerian Regime

The Algerian political regime is characterized by its military nature in essence. The Generals who took part in the 1991 coup were the ones who ruled Algeria behind the scenes and made its presidents since that period. It is true, there are institutions of a civil state, democracy, and elections, but they are all formality and do not participate at all in the fateful decisions of the country. When we talk about the military establishment, we are talking about two main bodies: the intelligence and the military staff. The competition between these two bodies and the sharing of interests among its major figures have always shaped the content of the decision in Algeria. Even the president himself is a product of the balance between these two bodies. However, although the current Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was a product of these existing balances, as we have

said before, the president has succeeded this time in taking power from this establishment to the presidency. One of the most famous statements of Bouteflika, when he came to power, was: "I would not like to be a three-quarters of a president", calling the Algerian people to stand with him until he restores the full authority, in reference to his desire to neutralize the military establishment and keep it away from the political decision. We have already mentioned briefly the features of the wing-struggle within the Algerian regime, which continues to this day, and has recently exploded because of the cocaine issue. The Spanish border police have informed the Algerian intelligence service (and not the police) that a huge quantity of cocaine (701 kg) will enter Algeria via the sea, it is coming from Brazil. The army has moved to confiscate it and impede the operation. This case revealed later the involvement of many political and military leaders and police leaders as well. As a result of the story, the military led by General Al-Gaid Al-Saleh took advantage of the case to strongly strike some influential figures, especially who have the ambition to be the next president of Algeria (Like Abdulghani Al-Hamel the General Director of Police) and keeping them away from the political game, because they can use this position later against its interests. So, this is the nature of the Algerian political regime, divided into wings struggling for power away from the will of people who never possess sovereignty at all.

The Weakness of Civil Society and its Containment by the Regime

Civil society plays an important role in any process of democratic transition. Civil society plays the role of mediator between people and authority. It is formed by a group of voluntary organizations which have an independent will from the state institutions such as student unions, Worker syndicates, trade unions, free economic institutions and others. The largest part of these organizations

in Algeria, which was created to express the voice of the Authority, it is funded by the Authority, because it is difficult in Algeria to establish a civic organization with an independent will and funding. With the approaching of any election date, these organizations support the candidate of regime, here, we can refer to the positions of Mr. Abdel Majid Sidi El-Said, president of the General Union of Algerian Workers, which is always with the desires of the presidency. Today he is a strong supporter of the president's brother, El-Said Bouteflika. The same is true of Mr. Ali Haddad, director-general of the Forum of Algerian Enterprise Heads, the largest gathering of Algerian businessmen in the country. The man strongly supports the presidential wing (which created him), and there is no one in Algeria does not know his close personal relationship with the brother of President Bouteflika. Meanwhile, the regime keeps other businessmen away, just because they have opposition voices like Mr. Saad Rabrab, one of the richest businessman in the Arab world in general, and he is the head of the industrial group Civital, one of the world's largest sugar refineries.

Therefore, the inability of the society to establish independent civil society organizations which are not contained by the Authority is an additional factor in the democratic deficit phenomenon that has been in place for decades. It is also a sign of the impossibility of a democratic change led by civil society figures in Algeria.

The Rising Prices of Rent and the Low Taxes Imposed on People

In 2012, American scholar Michael Ross wrote his most famous book entitled, "The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations". This book is the most important theoretical contribution which related the problem of democratic deficit with oil wealth. The more the state – in the third world – possesses a great oil wealth,

the more it gets suffered in its transition to democracy. It seems that this theory has a tremendous explanatory power with regard to the state of democracy in Algeria, as Algeria is one of the richest countries with natural resources, especially oil and natural gas.

Since President Bouteflika came to power in 1999, oil prices have continued to rise. Since 2001, the world has known two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have caused an increase in the price of oil. Also, some international crises (such as the Syrian war, Ukrainian war, Yemen war, and others) effectively contributed to saving Bouteflika mandates later. These wars and crises were in favor of all rentier states such as Algeria, with oil representing about 97% of the national income of Algeria, which was able to sell huge quantities of oil. So, the Algerian regime benefited from rent income to employ it in the so-called "buy social peace" policy. In addition to the policy of tax cuts on people, the Algerian government has spent large sums to contain the growing anger of people because of many social problems, as well as the limitation of the horizon of democracy and freedoms in the country. These include, for example, facilitating the extraction of bank loans for young people to open profitable projects or small economic institutions, or the like. This policy has proved its relative success, especially with the increase of "the Arab Spring waves" in Tunisia and Egypt and the war in Syria, but it is a long-term failed policy that will not address the discontent of people in all sectors. The government announced almost a year ago that it will be entering a stage of austerity, so we can say, it would not be in its favor at all.

The External Factor

Since Algeria's independence in 1962, France remains the most influential external actor in Algeria, it was said that Generals who ruling now the country behind the curtain were elements within the French army(Promotion

de LACOSTE) then, they left it and joined the revolution before it finished in 1958. It is still a big controversy about those Generals and causes of their inclusion by the previous President Houari Boumediene in the army on the pretext of benefiting from their military experience. Today, there is a list of influential names in the country takes its support from France, including politicians, civilians, Generals or ministers, and many of them personally benefit from their relationships with France, such as having the facility to buy expensive residences in Paris, or smuggling money or the like.

More than half a century after the independence of Algeria, observers see a significant decline of France's influence in the country in favor of other competing foreign powers in North Africa, led by the United States. Today, there is a talk about a "US wing" as a strong rival to the French wing inside the Algerian regime. Let us clarify this issue with two examples. The first example relates to General Toufik, whom Bouteflika removed from the arena, but his shadow remains strong. Many wonder how the man who ruled Algeria from behind the curtain for 25 years could disappear so easily, at the time when he named himself "Lord of Algeria"? According to a report published in the French website "Monde d'Afrique" in 2017, Trump's current administration consider General Toufik as an important man, especially since the man was at the head of Algeria's intelligence for the past 25 years, where he built strong information networks in Mali, Libya, and even Syria which can be useful for the United States in its policy towards North African and Mediterranean region. Among what the website quoted that the General Tawfik still working silently, he is making his home as a place for secret meetings. Also, the website said that General Tawfik was able to gather a lot of information thanks to the penetrating of his intelligence establishment to many terrorist groups, which he transferred to the

US intelligence in his visit to the USA in summer of 2001. The information said that there were possible terrorist attacks on the United States territory soon, but the US intelligence did not take this information seriously than, the September 11 tragedy was happening. Since then General Tawfik has become a very important man for the Americans.[1] The second example is related to a character named Mr. Abdelmoumen Ould Kaddour, who has been the General Manager of Sonatrach Oil Company since 2017, which is considered as Algeria's number one company with excellence and represents 97% of the country's income. The case of the appointment of Mr. Ould Kaddour at the head of this company has caused a great deal of confusion among the Algerians. In 2007, he was convicted of treason and conspiracy with a foreign country (The USA) after the finding of sophisticated listening devices in his office and home when he was the director of an Algerian-American company called Brown & Root-Condor. No one knows until now whether his appointment means that he did not any such mistake or reflects the US pressure to keep its ally there after the scandal involving their former ally Chakib Khelil? No one from outside closed circle of power knows yet, what is now known to all Algerians is the political relations with France contributed to the country's backwardness more, so, they do not want other similar relations with any other foreign power at the expense of their development and civilizational progress.

It should be noted at the end of this section that, despite the rivalry between France and the United States in Algeria, both have a common interest in keeping Algeria as a stable state in the security level, and therefore, prevent it from the Libyan example, as it turns into a failed state that exports many forms of security threats and risks toward Europe (such as illegal immigration, terrorism, smuggling of drugs, weapons, etc). Geopolitically, Algeria is a "buffer state" for the national

security of the Northern Mediterranean countries side. For this reason, the Western powers, especially the United States and France, will be keen to stabilize Algeria in terms of security, and to prevent it from chaos (Such as Arab Spring Uprisings) through the support of the stronger internal side (currently the Army Chief of Staff) so as to avoid unnecessary security problems in the whole region.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we see that the factors of the democratic deficit in Algeria are compound factors, not limited to one reason, although it is different in their impact scales. In our perspective, the military nature of the political regime is the most important factor in the democratic deficit experienced by the country, and there is no hope of a change toward democracy – without blood - unless the influential characters in the regime decide this matter or they disappear for some reason. However,

Despite the rivalry between France and the United States in Algeria, both have a common interest in keeping Algeria as a stable state in the security level.

we believe that the first rational step towards a proper democratic transition is linked to the role of educated and intellectual elites in consolidating the values of democracy in the minds of people, educated them and contributing to awareness of their rights, and eliminating their negative and wrong political culture through an active involvement in the society and state affairs, or to be organic intellectuals as Gramsci said. The process of proper change we believe in is a mission of the intellectual class par excellence. It is the only party that can take people out of their state of "anesthetization" they are living since decades, on the other hand, exerting pressure on the authoritarian regime through the means of education and awareness. One of the main reasons for the continuation of the political corruption phenomenon in Algeria is the resignation of the intellectual class from its historical mission, so, the end of this political corruption in Algeria is linked to the return of this class strongly to the educational and cultural struggle again.

End Notes

*   An Algerian author and researcher at The Institute for Middle Eastern Studies and Islamic World at Marmara University – Istanbul, Turkey. Also, at the department of Asian studies and International Relations at Algiers 3 University-Algeria. He is the author of: "The Impact of International System Structure Changes on The Grand Trends of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Struggle for independent Free Will in an International inevitable environment".

1   Louise Dimitrakis, **La main tendue de Washington au général Toufik**, Mondafrique, 06/02/2017.https://mondafrique.com/main-tendue-de-washington-general-toufik/

The Polemics and Politics of
Ethiopia's Disintegration

MÜKERREM MİFTAH

D isintegration, or more precisely secession, has been one of the most uninterruptedly recycled themes in the modern political history of Ethiopia. Different political groups, with vested interests in the country, used, redefined, and channeled it through various ways under different circumstances. In the post-monarchical Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and others went to the extent of taking up arms for what they believed was in the best interests of the people whom they supposedly represent. Bear with me, I have not forgotten, and thus, ruled out Eritrea from this brainstorming exercise. The case of Eritrea can, and definitely, serve a very salient purpose shortly.

From the outset, their claims were crystal-clear: a marked dissatisfaction with the existing political order in Ethiopia, and due to which, they opted for independence. Before proceeding further, however, let us raise some important questions worth asking here: Was it, and still is, a question of *sine qua non* importance in Ethiopia? Can historical, geographical, sociological, economic, and political infrastructures vouch for it? Can we make a relatively weighty distinction between the rhetorical, polemical or strategic deployment of "disintegration" or secession and its actuality on the ground as in the case with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) or today's PFDJ of Eritrea? The following paragraphs provide a preliminary engagement with these questions.

> *The Eritrean political movement against the Ethiopian establishment was much older than the TPLF.*

The Pretexts of Disintegration

Ethiopia as a country of multiple identities is a recent phenomenon. Historically, different political groups, hailing from the different parts of today's Ethiopia, attempted to create a strong political unit in-and-around today's Ethiopia. Of the many expansionist and "unifying" projects of various political leaders, the experiences of Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, Tewodros II, and Menelik II are particularly relevant. While Al-Ghazi's venture in the sixteenth century often portrayed, among conservative Christians and historians of Christianity and the Christian state in Ethiopia, as destructive and nothing short of foreign invasion, Tewodros and Menelik were generously appraised as torchbearers of the much-needed unity, modernity, and, most importantly, as the architects of today's Ethiopia.

Although religion and economic interests (fertile land, human labor, etc) largely explain much of the political activities in Ethiopian history, political domination in many ways went along with ethnolinguistic pursuits. In other words, the Tigray and Amhara have been the emperors and rulers of Ethiopia for centuries, up until the Derg military junta took over power in 1974. Now, from Menelik II all the way through Haile Selassie I, the Amhara generally ruled the country. In spite of elevating the status of Ethiopia in Africa and the world (the victory of Adowa against the Italians was achieved through the mobilization of different ethnic groups under Menelik II; Halie Selassie I contributed significantly to the formation of the African Union; and etc), the period sow the seeds

of much of today's chaotic sociocultural, economic, and political conditions and uncertainties in the country. Simply put, this period, in many ways, had shaped the future of the Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. Among other things, it was in this period that movements like the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) discovered their sense of being, causes, and aspirations. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) also adopted relatively the same path.

The Eritrean political movement against the Ethiopian establishment was much older than the TPLF. The movement started with a bitter dissatisfaction with the Ethiopian ethnoreligious political order. Although some trace the genealogy of the much earlier Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) to a political sidelining, religious-based discrimination, and oppression before Haile Selassie I, a direct confrontation seemed to start with Hamid Idris Awate's first fired shot against the Imperial force of Haile Selassie I in 1961.[1] Apart from religion and the forceful imposition of language, the last emperor's negation of the then UN resolution of Ethio-Eritrea federation and "re-integrating" Eritrea through occupation apparently strengthened the ideological and sentimental convictions of the ELF and later the EPLF.[2] In short, EPLF managed to get the independence of Eritrea through a referendum in the 1990s. The case with TPLF, however, is something different in a number of ways.

The TPLF movement, unlike the EPLF of Eritrea, traces the origin of its discontents to the time elapsed between the death of Yohannes IV (Tigrayan Emperor of Ethiopia, 1872-1889) and the Derg regime (1974-1991). In the years between these historical periods, TPLF's political manifesto clearly mentions the peripheralization and marginalization of the Tigray ethnoreligious

group under Amhara "domination." Aregawi Berhe, then "hard-core nationalist" and one of the seven founders of TPLF (although he left TPLF after Legesse Zenawi and his affiliates came to dominate TPLF), argued that TPLF's secessionist movement like " any other nationalist movement would also have considered such a direction if it had had to endure Menelik, Haile Selassie, and Mengistu's ethnic cleansing."[3] Haile Selassie I, in collaboration with the British Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1943, for instance, massacred "thousands of defenseless civilians" in Tigray (Mekelle) who, out of desperation, revolted ('Woyane') against his rule.[4] In addition to bombarding the people, he then went on to introducing heavy taxation system, snatched the locally based political power "in the name of centralization," land was confiscated, etc.[5]

The manifesto notes exploitations and oppressions in many directions, among others, in such issues as self-rule, language use, and the recurrence of drought and famine.[6] Aregawi Berhe claimed that the people of Tigray often experienced a certain degree of disparagement, belittlement, and disdain during the Haile Selassie regime. Many people of Tigray ethnic background were forced to flee Tigray, due to Haile Selassie's harsh treatment, the recurrence of drought, and famine in the northern part of Ethiopia, and relocate and work in places where they were hired as blue color workers and manual laborers, especially in-and-around Addis Ababa. According to Berhe, this had earned them "derogatory names."[7] These conditions, therefore, cumulatively paved the way for calling for the "Independent Republic of Tigray" as clearly spelled out in the original TPLF's manifesto.[8] Even though the idea of "Tigray republic" has been replaced by "self-determination" with the possibility of secession under TPLF's vexed constitution (article 39), the old idea of secession remains vital among TPLF's elites and social media activists.[9] The Oromo Liberation movement

(OLF), perhaps one of the world's long-running insurgent groups, fought for an independent Oromia. Unlike TPLF, the narrative underpinning of OLF was based on the assumption that the "Abyssinians colonized" the rest of Ethiopia, especially the people of Oromo, culture, and land.[10] Here, the "Abyssinians" refers to the people/leaders of Tigray and Amhara. It follows, therefore, that the movement's view of Ethiopia was expressed through its rebellion against the "thousands of years" old political leadership and history of Ethiopia. The oppression, exploitation, and denigration of the people of Oromo informed OLF's long-carried out armed struggle. Similarly, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) fought against what it considered ethnoreligious domination, oppression, and injustice in Ethiopia. ONLF sought the secession of Ethiopia's Somali region, also called Ogaden, in Eastern Ethiopia.[11]

As of 2018, however, OLF and ONLF officially made it clear that they will no longer employ arms and dropped their bid for secession. Ethiopia's current Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, and his close associates brought about important changes new to the modern political history of Ethiopia.[12] This was a result of unflinching mass protest and the internal decaying of the TPLF dominated Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Since taking office in April 2018, Ethiopia saw many transformative steps taken at many levels, which were not even theoretically possible under the last 27 years of TPLF led totalitarian rule in the country. Of the many bold reformative actions, the prime minister's offer of reconciliation and collaboration with all opposition groups in-and-out of Ethiopia clearly stand out. Welcoming the offer, many political groups, armed or not, started negotiating with the government. This, among other things, proved meaningful and trustworthy, especially for OLF and

ONLF, to make them rethink their means of achieving their political ends.[13] Finally, all armed groups, including Ginbot Seven, OLF, and ONLF, agreed to move from arms-based struggle to peaceful political struggle. It is, however, far from clear whether TPLF as a political figurehead of the Tigray ethnic group whole-heartedly moved from its initial position, regardless of the feasibility of its intentions in the Horn of Africa.

Interrogating Secessionist Politics in Ethiopia

Even though the discourses of "secession" and "independence" of ethnic groups as independent nation-states largely serve as polemical and rhetorical devices, it is far from being doable and favorable on many grounds. One may need to examine some four major factors that, in one way or another, determine this grand and attractive project but that does not appear, in light of a closer scrutiny, to have been clearly well-thought-out. Unless it is, of course, meant to serve as a rhetorical or polemical strategy to other ends, socio-economic and political justice and self-rule under the larger Ethiopia.

The first important factor would be the difficulty geography poses. Now, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to curve out nation states out of Ethiopia in its current geographical makeup. Imagine the making of the "Tigray Republic" and the state of Oromia! Geographical boundary (*yedenber yegebagnal teyaqewoch*) problems, even as regional states within Ethiopia, have always been the causes for the death of thousands, if not in millions, of citizens along Tigray-Amhara and Oromia-Somali regional states' "borders" for decades. Furthermore, the Tigray regional state, unlike any other parts of Ethiopia, has been known for mass

starvation, food insecurity, and drought for *centuries*. This applies, to a larger extent, to the Amhara regional state as well. Historically, one of the important factors in the internal migration of citizens, especially from the Northern end of Ethiopia to the rest of Ethiopia, has been conditioned–and–due to these recurrent problems.

The second critical factor is related to the demographic and cultural constitution of these societies in Ethiopia. Ethiopia, being one of the oldest states in the world, there has always been crossbreeding between different ethnic and cultural groups. Due to this, there are many "borderline societies" that cut across existing regional states' geographical borders, and as such, it will ultimately pose fundamental problems. No need to go anywhere to showcase this. The Horn of Africa has ample experiences; almost all states in the region have the "problem" of "borderline societies".

The third important factor has a lot to do with the political economy and geopolitics of Ethiopia and the Horn. Many of the rural societies of Ethiopia are either largely agriculturalists, agro–pastoralists, or pastoralists. The Ethiopian economy, no matter whether it has been registering an unprecedented economic growth for the last two or three decades or not, is one of the poorest in the world. Notwithstanding this, it has benefited from the diversity of economic activities in the different parts of Ethiopia. In other words, if the complementarity of economic activities fueled the Ethiopia economy, and conversely, if it fails to develop out of its misery through the amalgamation of different economic activities coming from the different parts of Ethiopia, one can hardly miss what would happen if Ethiopia

were to decompose into tiny states with fragmented economic basis or specialization. In geopolitical terms, the political elites of TPLF have been, for many years, at odds with the Amhara down in the South and the EPLF of Eritrea up in the north. Other related issues in this regard include regional security issues, access to ports, military capacity, and others remain as very important factors as the four addressed here–the fourth factor follows next.

Finally, the idea and practice of secession have been attractive for many states and "would-be" states in the Horn of Africa.

TPLF and OLF could learn many things from the experiences of Somalia

However, there seem(s) to be no model state(s) succeeded in building economically strong and political viable society(ies) in the Horn of Africa. TPLF and OLF could learn many things from the experiences of Somalia in the eastern corners of the Horn of Africa, Eritrea in the North of Ethiopia, and South Sudan in the North West of Ethiopia. Arguably, except for some form of "nominal" freedom (assuming freedom encompasses many issues), none of them has achieved any reasonable success by seceding from their closely aligned societies, at least economically and politically. This is particularly the case with Eritrea and South Sudan. In fact, for these and other reasons, many named these states as failed or fragile states.[14] A closely related issue with this last factor would be the challenge of devolving a nation with its own unique identity and history. Overall, despite the reasonability of demands based on economic, political, and cultural mistreatment and injustice in the context of Ethiopia, the idea and practice of secession appear less attractive and its feasibility an uphill battle in today's world.

End Notes

1   Plaut, M. 2016. Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa's Most Repressive State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2   Ibid.

3   Praeg, B. 2006. Ethiopia and Political Renaissance in Africa. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

4   Berhe, A. 2004. "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front". African Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 413, pp. 569–592.

5   Ibid, p.527.

6   TPLF's manifesto (1976): https://tassew.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/tplf_manifesto_-_1968_e-c.pdf

7   Ibid.

8   Gebreab in Praeg, B. (2006; p.81).

9   See https://borkena.com/2018/02/06/tplf-struggles-to-restore-dominance/

10   See https://www.refworld.org/docid/5696030f4.html

11   See https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/ethiopian-ogaden-rebels-abandon-secession-bid/

12   See http://addisstandard.com/commentary-legitimacy-at-home-is-legitimacy-abroad/

13   Emily Wax, "As separatists in Ethiopia disarm, a new chapter for D.C.'s Oromo community" The Washington Post, April 1, 2012.

14   See http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/ and https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failed-states.html

THE RISE OF THE
MUSLIM POPULATION
IN EUROPE!

INSAMER

Religiously Divided Structure of the Israeli Jewish Society

SÜHA YURDAKUL

I srael is the country with the largest core Jewish population in the world; it is also the only country in the world where the majority of the society is composed of Jews. There are some different sub-groups in the Israeli Judaism which cause deep divisions within the society. These groups can be divided into four major categories where every single one of them corresponds to a different segment; they are *Hiloni* (secular), *Masorti* (traditional), *Dati* (religious) and *Haredi* (ultra-orthodox).[1] In this study, these categories that emerged within the Israeli Judaism are going to be examined regarding to their differences. The study is going to be limited to the groups that are represented in Israel and at the end of this study the impact of these groups on the Israeli social and religious life is going to be revealed.

In the beginning of 2017, the world's Jewish population was assessed at 14,511,100 and approximately 44.5% of them live in Israel. The total number of Jews residing in Israel together with the occupied East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and Jews living in the West Bank is around 6,451,000 (77.1% of the total population). The countries with the highest Jewish population after Israel are the US (5,700,000), France (456,000), Canada (390,000) and the UK (289,500).[2] In addition, Israel rapidly increases its population with high birth rates (3.13 children per Jewish woman), new immigrants and limited number of religious conversions to Judaism (83.200 people between 1999 and 2014).[3]

After the genocide of Jews in Europe during World War II (1939-1945), a serious Jewish refugee problem emerged and in 1948, under the leadership of the Zionist ideology, the State of Israel (*Madinat Yisrael*) was established in Palestine to build a new homeland for the surviving Jews. Since its foundation, Israel has followed a repressive policy against the Palestinian Arabs and has hosted the migrations of various Jewish communities from different regions, who find it very difficult to reconcile among one another. The most important reason for this mass migration is "the Law of Return" which came into force in 1950. This law grants every single Jew from all around the world the absolute right to settle in Israel and gain automatic citizenship. All Jews who do not interfere in any activity against

World Jewish Population [2017]
In Total: 14.511.100
%44,5 of them live in Israel

the interests of the Jewish community and who are considered not to endanger the security of the Israeli state and its citizens can benefit from this law. Moreover, there is another enactment called "the Nationality Law of 1952". The Law of Return gives Jews the automatic right to immigrate to Israel, and the Nationality Law provides for the acquisition of citizenship in one of four different ways; the virtue of return, residence in Israel, birth and naturalization. These two laws are complementary pieces of legislation to support the right of Jews to move to Israel (*making Aliyah*) and receive Israeli citizenship.[4]

The Jewish community in Israel is composed of Ashkenazi[5], Sephardi[6] and Mizrahi (Eastern / Oriental) groups in terms of their ethnic origins. In the Israeli society, Ashkenazi Jews constitute the most privileged group in social, political and economic areas.[7] Jews in this group are of Central and Eastern European origin and include Jews who earlier migrated to North and South America, South Africa and Australia. These Jews migrated to Palestine in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[8] There were a lot of important politicians within this group who played significant roles in the establishment of the Israeli State. Sephardim is a Jewish

group with a lower status than Ashkenazim and contains different sub-groups which are hierarchically listed within itself. Sephardim consists mainly of Spanish and Mediterranean Jews of North Africa. Mizrahim, generally seen as a group in Sephardim, is the name given to the members of the ancient Jewish communities living in Islamic countries such as Syria, Iran and Lebanon in North Africa and the Middle East.[9] The Mizrahim includes the Jewish community of Yemen and the Ethiopian Jews, also called the Falashas. In Israel, there are also approximately 20,000 Jews who are the members of the Karaite Sect.[10]

In the early years of the establishment of Israel's secular Zionist government, due to the agreement with religious Orthodox Jews, the state of Israel only officially recognized Orthodox Judaism. This situation led the non-Orthodox Jewish organizations and denominations to gain informal status and to regulate religious rituals and practices in public sphere such as marriage, divorce, *Sabbath[11]* and *kasher*[12] according to the rules of *halakha* (the traditional Jewish religious law) within the framework of this preliminary acceptance.[13] Today, although the state of Israel is founded by a secular group, its conditions allow the state to be questioned by religious authorities and religion plays an active role within the country. Moreover, the practical religious services such as the arrangements in line with the religious rules, the construction of the synagogue and salary payments of the rabbis are implemented by the state.[14]

Unlike other Jewish communities in the world, Israeli Jews are divided into groups

BREAKDOWN OF JEWS IN ISRAEL

% of Israel Jews identify as...

according to their level of religiosity instead of denominational affiliation. Almost every Israeli Jew can be identified with one of the four categories, which are *Hiloni* (secular), *Masorti* (traditional), *Dati* (religious) and *Haredi* (ultra-orthodox). Hilonim include seculars that constitute the majority (49%) of the Jewish community in Israel. However, the seculars residing in Israel are more observant about the tradition than the seculars in the diaspora (outside Israel) and they regulate their lives according to some religious rules. While Datim correspond to the religious segment, Masortim involve the traditional group. The proportion of Masortim in Israeli society is 29%, while Datim's is 13%. Haredim correspond to the ultra-Orthodox group and include only a very small proportion (9%) of the Israeli Jewish community.[15]

military service for the Israeli government and this has been a recent topic of controversy in Israeli politics. Within this group, which consists of various congregations with different ideologies, there are a number of people who reject the existence of the state of Israel because of its establishment before the arrival of the Messiah, and there is also a considerable mass rejecting Zionism. Also, there are politicians within Haredim who play an active role in the political life of the country even though they share the same ideology.[16]

1. *Haredim* (Ultra-Orthodox Jews)

Haredim correspond to the most religious group among Israeli Jews. This group continues to exist by isolating itself from the society, and at the same time opposes marriage with other Jewish groups. Men belonging to this group receive religious education in state-supported religious educational institutions called *Yeshivas*. Haredim are exempted from

Hasidism, which is a sub-group within Haredim, is the most rigid group among the ultra-Orthodox Jews. For the children of the Hasidic Jews, religious life starts from the age of five and the heads of children are shaved in such a way that some of the hair is stretched from the sides according to the Hasidic traditions. They wear black hats and gowns and put fringes on the corners of a four-pointed garments. Married women

cover their heads with the help of hats, scarves or wigs. The Hasidic Jews do not acquire a profession and they study Torah in *Yeshivas* throughout their lives. They tend to have more children than the other Jewish groups. Even when Hasidism adopted a more moderate attitude after World War II, it is still criticized by secular groups.[17]

2. *Datim* (Religious Jews)

Datim correspond to 13% of Israeli Jewish society. In terms of the religiosity level, they represent the segment after Haredim. The most important aspect of this group that makes it different from Haredim is the adoption of Zionism. Members of this group are also called "Modern Orthodox Jews" because they strongly support adapting to the modern Jewish society. Approximately 90% of Datim have faith in God and almost all of the group members follow the *Sabbath* rules.[18] Jews in this group have more ambition for success and career than Haredim. They play an active role in Israeli politics and are more integrated into Israel's overall society than Haredim because they accept the modern Jewish state as the previous stage before the arrival of the Messiah.[19] The majority of this group (71%) argues that the Arabs should be expelled from Israel. This corresponds to a very high percentage compared to the other three groups. At the same time, Datim are more likely to serve in the military than Haredim. Compared to the other groups, Datim also more likely to argue that building Jewish settlements in the West Bank helps Israeli government to keep itself safe.[20]

3. *Masortim* (Traditional Jews)

Masortim represent the second largest group (29%) of the Jewish community in Israel and also the most diverse one of these four groups. This group also represents the middle ground between ultra-Orthodox Jews and secular Jews. Jews belonging to this group are separated from the other Jewish groups because they shape their religious understanding in a direction by taking the Jewish tradition into the center instead of the Torah and the *halakha*. Only 51% of the Jews in this group put religion in an important position for their lives, and it is observed that there is no consensus on religious and political matters in this group. For example, while 44% of Masortim favor shutting down public transport during the Sabbath, 52% of them oppose it. In addition, it was observed that this group is more open to communication with other groups and they also have friends from outside of their own sub-group than other categories.[21]

4. *Hilonim* (Secular Jews)

Hilonim, which correspond to approximately half of Israel's Jewish community, tend to be secular in their outlook. 40% of this group do not have the belief of God and only 18% of Hilonim are absolutely certain in their belief in God. Hilonim strongly favor the separation of religion from Israeli public life and members of this group fight against the Orthodoxy's control over marriage and divorce. According to Hilonim, the Israeli identity comes before their Jewish identity (59%). But this does not mean that they reject the claim that a Jewish state is necessary for the survival of the Jewish community.

The secular Jews belonging to this group also participate in Jewish religious rituals and prefer to observe some religious practices like maintaining kasher, lighting *Hanukkah* candles and fasting on *Yom Kippur*. What drives them is the cultural and ancestral dimension of such activities rather than being a matter of religion (only 4% think being Jewish is a matter of religion). Therefore, it can be said

that the vast majority of the secular group (83%) consider Jewish identity as a cultural phenomenon rather than a religious issue and therefore they partake in some religious (at the same time seen as cultural) rituals.[22] Hilonim, which consist mainly of European Zionist Ashkenazi groups, have a small number of people who emphasize the Hebrew identity instead of ethnic, religious or cultural Jewish identity. There is also a left-wing segment within this group, such as the post-Zionists, who want to purify Israel from its Jewish identity and make it become a democratic and egalitarian state.[23]

These groups contrast among one another in many ways. For example, religious Jewish groups (Haredim and Datim) argue that public transportation should be shut down during the Sabbath, while the secular segments strongly oppose it. Ultra-Orthodox Jews (89%) argue that the traditional Jewish religious law (*halakha*) should take precedence in the state administration, while secular Jews believe that the democratic ideals are more important than Jewish religious law. Moreover, 48% of the Jews think that the Arabs should be expelled from Israel while 46% do not agree with this idea.[24]

The distinction among these categories also prevents group members to marry people from the other Jewish sub-groups. Almost all ultra-Orthodox Jews (95%) and secular Jews (93%) prefer to marry those only within their own group. This rate is lower in Masorti and Datim. In addition, these major social fractures of Israeli society are apparent in citizens' friendship preferences. For instance, while 90% of Israeli secular Jews mostly have friends within their own segment of Jewish society, 89% of ultra-Orthodox Jews and 72% of religious Jews stated that all or most of their close friends were members of their own sub-groups.[25]

As a result, in Israel, all Jews can be identified with one of four major categories such as *Hiloni* (secular), *Masorti* (traditional), *Dati* (religious) and *Haredi*(ultra-orthodox). The members of these different sub-groups are in contradiction in many ways and very difficult to reconcile with one another. The most important reason for this contradiction is the ethnically, culturally, politically, and religiously divided structure of the Israeli Jewish society that resulted from the mass migrations starting before the foundation of the Israeli state, reinforced by the "the Law of Return", which grants every Jew all over the world the absolute right to move to Israel and gain immediate citizenship. When this situation is considered together with Israel's pressure on Palestinian Arabs, the contradictions of the heterogeneous and tense structure of the Israeli society is becoming more apparent. It can be stated that the only thing that holds this structure together is the discourse of anti-Semitism which is frequently emphasized with the so-called "Arab threat" in the region.

> *In Israel, all Jews can be identified with one of four major categories such as Hiloni (secular), Masorti (traditional), Dati (religious) and Haredi(ultra-orthodox).*

End Notes

1   In Hebrew, the plural forms of these words are: Hi*lonim, Masortim, Datim* and *Haredim*.

2   In Turkey, the Jewish population estimated at 15.300.

3   S. DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 2017", Mandell L. Berman Inst., North American Jewish Databank, www.jewishdatabank.org (Accessed April 13, 2019).

4   Yabuda Savir, "The Definition of a Jew Under Israel's Law of Return", *SMU Law Review*, 17/1 (1963): 125-126.

5   Also known as Ashkenazic Jews or simply Ashkenazim.

6   Sephardic Jews or Sephardim originally from Sepharad.

7   Salime Leyla Gürkan, *Yahudilik*, (İstanbul: İSAM, 2012), p.79.

8   Yusuf Besalel, *Yahudi Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Gözlem Gazetecilik Basın ve Yayın A.Ş., 2003), p. 299.

9   Ibid., p. 299.

10 Salime Leyla Gürkan, *Yahudilik*, p. 79.

11 Sabbath is the weekly day of rest which is observed from sunset on Friday until nightfall on Saturday. It is written in the Bible that God created the world in six days and rested on the seventh day. He blessed this day and declared it holy (Gn. 2.3). This day is also mentioned in the Ten Commandments (Ex. 20.8-11).

12 Kasher means the food prepared in accordance with the Jewish dietary laws.

13 Salime Leyla Gürkan, *Yahudilik*, p. 80.

14 Mustafa Alıcı, "Yahudilikte Otorite Kurumları Üzerine", *Akra Kültür Sanat ve Edebiyat Dergisi*, 7 (2015): 25.

15 Kelsey Jo Starr & David Masci, "In Israel, Jews are united by homeland but divided into very different groups",

Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/08/in-israel-jews-are-united-by-homeland-but-divided-into-very-different-groups/ (Accessed April 13, 2019).

16 Ibid.

17 Baki Adam, "*Yahudilik*: Tarihsel Gelişimi, İnanç Esasları ve İbadetleri", *Yaşayan Dünya Dinleri*, ed. Şinasi Gündüz, (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 2010), p. 246.

18 Kelsey Jo Starr & David Masci, "In Israel, Jews are united by homeland but divided into very different groups" (Accessed April 13, 2019).

19 Yusuf Besalel, *Yahudi Tarihi*, p. 300.

20 Kelsey Jo Starr & David Masci, , "In Israel, Jews are united by homeland but divided into very different groups" (Accessed April 13, 2019).

21 Michael Lipka, "7 Key findings about religion and politics in Israel", *Pew Research Center*, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/08/key-findings-religion-politics-israel/(Accessed April 13, 2019).

22 Kelsey Jo Starr & David Masci, "In Israel, Jews are united by homeland but divided into very different groups" (Accessed April 13, 2019).

23 Salime Leyla Gürkan, *Yahudilik*, p. 81.

24 Michael Lipka, "7 Key findings about religion and politics in Israel" (Accessed April 13, 2019).

25 Caryle Murphy, "Religious groups in Israel keep themselves when it comes to marriages and friendships", *Pew Research Center*, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/04/religious-groups-in-israel-keep-to-themselves-when-it-comes-to-marriages-and-friendships-2/ (Accessed April 13, 2019).

Complex Border Problems between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan:
Is There a Possible Solution?

BURAK ÇALIŞKAN

Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who won the Uzbekistan's election in December 2016 after the death of his predecessor Islam Karimov, tried to take swift and radical steps in Uzbekistan politics and fix the old regime's foreign policy in relations with its neighbours and the international community.

With regards of Kyrgyztan, the Mirziyoyev administration has made significant progress, particularly regarding problems such as communication and transportation between the two countries, especially in the unresolved border issues. In September 2017, the Uzbek leader organized an official visit to Kyrgyzstan, where both leaders agreed to open the border gate between the two countries that the Karimov regime closed unilaterally in 2010. The event was followed by the resolutions on other border problems that were considered simple, but continued for years. However, the complex border problems between the two countries, including the five ethnic enclaves shared by the two countries, are tricky, and require careful resolutions.

It is best to leave bitter history in the past, and for the sake of the peoples of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyztan, friendship, whether in its borders or between both administrations and peoples, should be developed.

The Soviet Union's construction of artificial borders was design by Joseph Stalin nearly a century ago to prevent unity among Central Asian peoples; and this constitutes the basis for the complex border problems experienced in the region today. There are four exclaves[1] of Uzbekistan in Kyrgyzstan, while Kyrgyzstan has one exclave in Uzbekistan.

Uzbek citizens living in Uzbekistan exclaves such as Sokh, Shakhimardan, Jani-Ayil and Chon Qora in Kyrgyzstan must pass through Kyrgyz border posts whenever they want to leave the enclaves. Similarly, the Kyrgyz citizens in Uzbekistan who live in Barak are faced with similar situation.

There were problems particularly between the local people and Kyrgyz border guards in Sokh, where more than 50,000 Uzbek citizens lived. Rebellions initiated by the people of the region resulted in the road and border closure at the time of the Bishkek administration. The Kyrgyz government did not approve the demand for a road linking Uzbekistan to Sokh. These tense bilateral relations took place in the period of Karimov.

However the more relaxed atmosphere brought by Mirziyoyev created a hope to these complex border problems. As a matter of fact, the Uzbek and Kyrgyz authorities stated that they wanted to resolve the decades-long border dispute as soon as possible. But, it is not that easy to conclude this confusion between the two neighbours.

In 2017, Uzbek and Kyrgyz leaders carried

out an exchange of small areas as a solution. It was believed that other border problems could be solved by this option. At this point, the negotiations on the Kyrgyz exclave Barak, had been going on for a while between the two countries. Until a few years ago, more than 1,000 Kyrgyz lived in Barak, and today there are only 70 people known to live there. The exchange of an area equivalent to Barak between the two countries has come up through the demand of the Kyrgyz citizens.

However the main issue lies on the attitude of the people in the exchange-proposed regions. It should be understood that the exchange of a large region with a 50,000 population such as Sokh is no walk at the park. Persuading the Uzbek people who have lived in the region for centuries to move elsewhere would be a very difficult and painful process.

The second option is the creation of corridors from the exclaves to each main countries, this includes giving the lands for the corridors to the countries. This will affect fewer people than the first option, but organizing border crossings after the building of corridors will create a greater confusion. The possibility of new problems in cross-regional access is the greatest concern for this option.

> *It is best to leave bitter history in the past, and for the sake of the peoples of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyztan, friendship, whether in its borders or between both administrations and peoples, should be developed.*

The third option is the creation of completely free and open borders between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. This way, a solution resembling the Belgian-Dutch border is aimed. In a sense, this method will enable the peoples living in the exclaves to move comfortably to their main countries. Mirziyoyev himself mentioned that the two countries' border should be turned into a "border of friendship". Taking such a decision would encourage for the solution of the other border problems in Central Asia as well as for the Bishkek-Tashkent relations to an advanced level.[2]

No two neighbouring countries can sleep tight at night when the relationship between them is not constructive. It is best to leave bitter history in the past, and for the sake of the peoples of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyztan, friendship, whether in its borders or between both administrations and peoples, should be developed.

End Notes

1   A portion of territory of one state completely surrounded by territory of another or others, as viewed by the home territory.

2   Pete Baumgartner, "Tug-Of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look To Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, December, 14, 2017. https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-kyrgyzstan-resolving-decades-old-border-dispute/28918059.html

Changing Dynamics of
Security in South Asia

ABDUL WAHEED PARRY

The concept of security has undergone a drastic change in the past few decades. The traditional, military/state-centric approach of security has been replaced by non-conventional approaches. The world in post-cold war era has witnessed a shift in viewing security issues. Environment, human security and societal issues have occupied the main place in policy-making corridors of world states.

South Asia is also facing the same challenges in terms of its security. Non-traditional issues like environmental degradation, food scarcity, resource crisis, humanitarian issues, water crisis etc. are just some of the issues that have emerged in the region. The security policies of the states in the region are increasingly founded on these issues. The contention between India and Pakistan and between India and Bangladesh are based on humanitarian crisis and water disputes. The ongoing conflict of Kashmir, the crisis of the Indus basin, Ganga and Teesta River are the major reasons for the conflicting situations among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

IDPs, resource sharing of these states, food and environment issues, natural disasters and epidemics are also responsible for threatening the security of the South Asian region. Proper attention towards these non-conventional security points and strategic policymaking might just save the region from further tensions.

Human security is at the core of non-traditional security concept. Many scholars have written at length on this issue and world organizations have produced policies to deal with the issue of human security. In the mid-nineties the United Nations managed to define this new dimension of security.

The United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Human Development Report-1994 defined human security as including "safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and; protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives, whether in homes, Jobs or communities" (UNDP, 1994)

This definition changed the very concept of security. Ordinary people and their concerns began to be taken into consideration. The HDR-1994 gave out seven components of human security paradigm including economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.

The long-standing dispute of Kashmir has put human security in this area under a microscope. The conflict between India and Pakistan is a continuous threat to human security. The protection and preservation of individuals within the region has become a challenge for the groups and organizations working to ensure human security. The violations to personal freedom and basic human rights have become a norm in India and Pakistani administered Kashmir. Extra judicial killings and forced disappearances are major human security-related problems in the region. India in its administered Kashmir is violating all the basic principles of UN Human Rights Charter. Recently the UN published a report on India's human rights violations in Kashmir. The report published on 14 June 2018 said, "There is an urgent need to address past and ongoing human rights violations and abuses and deliver justice for all people in Kashmir, who for seven decades have suffered a conflict that has claimed or ruined numerous lives". [UN OHCHR, Jun 2018]

Similarly the formation of domestic war crimes tribunal in Bangladesh setup in 2009 to investigate and prosecute suspects for the genocide committed in 1971 has resulted in growing basic human rights violations, abuses and unjustified hangings in Bangladesh. The

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Haseena Wajid and her ruling party is using state missionary against their political rivals, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP). World-renowned rights groups and organizations have questioned the credibility of the Bangladeshi war crimes tribunal, which has put a question mark to this whole process of investigation and prosecution.

The issue of the displaced Afghani population, who are settled as refugees in Pakistan due to Russian invasion, is a matter of concern in the South Asian region. When Russia invaded Afghanistan millions of Afghan people fled to Pakistan and Iran. Presently there are around 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan. On the one hand Afghan refugees blame coerced return while on the other hand many Pakistan's officials and politicians believed there was proof that Afghan refugees are involved in terrorist activities. The weakening economic condition of Pakistan is another reason that the country wants Afghanis to return to their country. They feel it impossible for the Pakistani economy to bear the expenses of surplus refugees.

Previously Pakistan's Express Tribune published a report on the Afghan refugee crisis. The report, quoting analysts and some intellectuals, stated that issuing passports to Afghans born in Pakistan posed "threats to Pakistan's national security." The report further stated that, "some of them fall trap of terrorist elements" or they may "get involved into anti-Pakistan activities." This is just one of the major human security issues faced by the refugees there.

The unresolved issues in the region are the major impediment in the human development and human security of South Asia.

The Rohingya refugee crisis, still in the same region, is seen as the worst humanitarian disaster of our time. More than 1.3 million refugees were subject to violent attacks in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. Most of the Rohingya people fled to Bangladesh and set up camps in Cox's Bazar. The camps are overcrowded and small children are malnourished. Those two problems are nothing compared to the other problems that the refugees are facing in both registered and unregistered camps in Bangladesh. Each and every aspect of human security is violated there, from economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security up to political security. We can simply read the news to agree.

Human security in South Asia is a burning issue that needs to be urgently addressed. Unfortunately countries in the region are still more concerned about the traditional military dimension of security. Defense budgets of South Asian countries are directly and direly affecting human development in the region. People in the region, particularly in the countries affected by the conflicts and need humanitarian aid need to be addressed with the new paradigm of human security. The unresolved issues in the region are the major impediment in the human development and human security of South Asia. And while people in other regions might think that this does not concern them, slowly but surely the humanitarian crisis in this region will drag the world into an even bigger chaos.

The Core Standards for
Better Humanitarian System

ZÜLFİYE ZEYNEP BAKIR

Humanitarian action have existed throughout the history of civilization, across the world, and done with different practices. For instance, the Islamic ideas of zakat and other charities have been particularly important in Islamic geography. Similarly, other religions have a similar approach to those who need humanitarian assistance. However, the current international humanitarian system (classical humanitarian system or Dunantist system) originated from the West, and is mostly based on the European experience of wars and natural disasters.

In the 21st century, the Eurocentric perspective has become controversial in terms of understanding and responding to complex crisis situations. This is why so many criticisms have been voiced toward the classical humanitarian system. It should be noted that the concept of humanitarian aid has long been dominated by a classical paradigm. The primary aims of this paradigm are preventing human losses and providing the basic needs of people to survive, such as water, health, housing, and food. Also, this classical paradigm focuses solely on principled aid. The most fundamental criticism of the classical paradigm is about the focus of short-term relief provision. Furthermore, local aid providers are likely excluded from the humanitarian system's picture.

In recent years an alternative paradigm, called the Resilience Paradigm as well,

The nature of crises is always changing. (…) Aid programming will also become increasingly complex. Hence It's widely agreed that the aid system too needs to change.

was created by humanitarian actors and intellectuals. The paradigm foregrounds building on local response capabilities for the purpose of preventing a humanitarian crisis and eliminating undesirable conditions. It prioritizes on developing assistance programs such as health, housing, and education. Correspondingly, it also stresses on preventing dependency of victims, which is associated with the provision of relief, and contrasts it with development approaches. To put it in a different way, communities and people affected by crisis should have been given not only financial support but also initiatives for their self-sufficiency. In short, humanitarian actors should "not just give the fish" to the people in need, but teach them "how to catch the fish." In the meantime, it's useful to raise their awareness in terms of coping with crisis situation such as natural disasters, epidemics, wars and so on. Individuals should also be aspired to be involved in humanitarian activities.

The nature of crises is always changing. The prolonged conflict in Syria, the forced flight of the Rohingya people in Myanmar, the natural disasters categorized as catastrophic events, they all indicate a dramatically altering world of crises. Complicated crises will tend to become more common. Aid programming will also become increasingly complex. Hence It's widely agreed that the aid system too needs to change.

It is with this realization, humanitarian organizations have set out the Core

Humanitarian Standards (CHS), involving nine principles that INGOs/NGOs and individuals active in humanitarian actions can improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they supply. So humanitarian response is appropriate, relevant, effective, and timely. Besides, it strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects. It is very important for the standarts to be based on communication, participation, and feedback. Complaints of people in need are welcomed and addressed by humanitarian actors. Humanitarian response is coordinated and complementary. Humanitarian actors continuously learn and improve their profession. Staff are supported to do their job effectively, and are treated fairly and equitably. Resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended purpose.[1]

> *CHS is designed for organizations who directly play the financial and technical role of humanitarian responses.*

According to these standards, it is essential to response the expectations of the people in need by respecting their fundamental rights and dignity. Similarly, humanitarians must strengthen their accountability through improved responses. Accountability, which is usually considered as abidance and counting assigned performance indicators and reporting back, is an obligation on the part of decision-makers or those with power to account the use of that power. By strengthening accountability, individuals can hold humanitarian organizations to account should there be any unsuitable activities.

CHS is designed for organizations who directly play the financial and technical role of humanitarian responses. It stands on the the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence, accountability,

THE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR BETTER HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM

Humanitarian response is appropriate and relevant.

Humanitarian response is effective and timely.

Humanitarian response strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects.

Humanitarian response is based on communication, participation, and feedback.

Complaints are welcomed and addressed.

Humanitarian response is coordinated and complementary.

Humanitarian actors continuously learn and improve.

Staff are supported to do their job effectively, and are treated fairly and equitably.

Resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended purpose.

Source: CHS Alliance

transparency, gender equality, responsibility sharing and coordination. In the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS), communities and people affected by the crisis stand at the center of humanitarian action. It is essential to respect their fundamental human rights such as the right to live with dignity, protection, and security, adherring to the international law.

CHS was created as a respond to the changing needs of improvements in humanitarian practice. And the current humanitarian system needs to transform from that of emergency aid to development aid; because emergency needs always change once the moment of crisis passes, and the people in need seek longer-term assistances to rebuild their lives for a better future. And hopefully these people too can help others in the future.

To conclude, what is expected from humanitarian organizations is that the humanitarian actors should use the aforementioned criteria to shape their internal procedures. Thus, a rational attitude taking into account the needs of the societies trapped in humanitarian crises will be widespread for a better and sustainable humanitarian system.

End Notes

1   "Core Humanitarian Standards", *CHS Alliance, Group URD and the Sphere Project,* https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20Standard%20-%20English.pdf

ONLY MARRIED WOMEN EXPOSE TO VIOLENCE?

Not only married women, also single or divorced women can be expose to violence by men.

20,2% Divorced Women

9,9% Single Women

59,7% Married Women

EDUCATED PERSON NEVER COMMIT VIOLENCE?

According to research which was conducted in Turkey, 2015, **%35.5** of women have been exposed to **physical violence** in a period of their lives and common characteristics of these violent men are educated.

FALSE FACTS ABOUT
VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN

CASES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IS LESS IN THE WEST?

%33 women of European Union member countries have been exposed to **sexual, psychological and/or physical violence** by their husband or partner.

MEDIA ALWAYS HAS POSITIVE IMPACTS AND CONSTUCTIVE LANGUAGE UPON SOCIETY ABOUT NEWS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN?

The media has successfully attracted public attention on the issue of **violence against women.** Although some media still appear to downplay the issue by either using too rigid or too relaxed language.

iNSAMER

Green Revolution as the World's "Heart Transplant": Sweden Case

ELİF SELİN ÇALIK

Is economic crisis the only global problem we face in our lifetime, like the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008? Have you ever witnessed anything like the recent tragic flood after record rainfalls in Iran, days after their New Year (Nowruz) that caused devastation of cities in the country? Will this phenomenon become a global problem just like the Lehman Brothers' collapse? Or why does U.S Representative Ilhan Omar advocates for national emergency on climate change, instead against Trump's discriminating border wall, despite the U.S President's denial of climate change?

According to a recent United Nations report, extreme weather events displaced 2 million people in 2018 alone. As a young climate activist, 16 year-old Greta Thunberg said during her speech at the 2019 World Economic Forum that 'our house is on fire'. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) states that we are less than 12 years away from not being able to undo our mistakes. During that time, unprecedented changes in all aspects of society need to have taken place, including a reduction of our CO2 emissions by at least 50%.

In the context of climate change, there are many recommendations presented to defeat the devastating effects of climate change as it affects our life as tough as the economical crisis. It affects our homes and our families. Every country and individual accepts that fundamental changes are needed in order to conduct our economic system with both an ecological a social conscience. But, unfortunately only very few states and decision makers have taken logical and concrete steps, when in fact, governments worldwide are responsible to future generations and to the biosphere.

A Solution to the Climate Change: Clean Energy

In the geopolitics of the 20th century, energy played an important role and it continues to do so today. But the politics of renewable energy has remained largely confined to national boundaries and has had few international ramifications. Is this set to change? What is and could be the role of implementing renewables in energy diplomacy?

World-renowned economics Professor Jeffrey Sachs wrote in his book titled *The Age of Sustainable Development* that "The entire world economy has grown up as a fossil fuels based economy and yet fossil fuels are at the core of the climate change crisis…we must undertake a kind of 'heart transplant' replacing the beating heart of fossil fuel energy with an alternative based on low-carbon energy!" He stressed the importance of replacing fossil fuel energy with clean and pure energy as fossil fuels do substantially more damage than renewable sources by any measure. About 67 percent of the electricity generated in 2014 was from fossil fuels (coal, natural gas and petroleum), according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. In producing electricity, fossil fuels dumped millions of tons of carbon dioxide, arguably the prime reason for global warming, into the atmosphere.[1]

Renewable energy ('renewables') has been listed as the priorities of national energy policies over the last decade. As a concrete step, renewables definitely help reduce the world's dependence on climate-damaging, CO2-emitting fossil fuels - which currently meet around four-fifths of the world's energy needs - and can also contribute to security of supply by helping to diversify energy sources.

Therefore, in this article, as a case country, Sweden's renewable energy efforts will be reviewed in terms of defeating climate change and setting a new global agenda. Does this country aim on establishing climate diplomacy to leave a sustainable life for the next generations?

# Sweden: Leading the Renewable Energy Revolution

While it is common knowledge that the Scandinavian countries are worldwide leaders in sustainable development, Sweden is at the top of the list in 2018. In December that year, Swedish utilities and power generators have already installed so many wind turbines that the Nordic nation is on course to reach its 2030 renewable energy target late last year. The Swedish Wind Energy Association's report *Svensk Vindenergi* writes on the quarterly edition about the statistics and forecasts for the Wind Power Market as it covered data from turbine manufacturers and wind power developers on the Swedish market (estimated coverage is 100 percent respectively 95 percent of the total Swedish market).

Green Certificate Market

Sweden has to deal with the biggest disadvantage of renewable energy, which is its high cost. Renewable energy is the way more expensive than hydrocarbons and nuclear power. Apart from direct subsidies, the Swedish government has also come up with some smart solutions, which enables it to support renewables without spending the state budget. In the heating sector, Sweden introduced the "carbon tax" in 1991, which is levied on CO_2 emissions. And then in 2003 the government also established the **"green certificate market"** to support renewable power struggling producers with low electricity prices. The idea of the "market" is that green power producers would receive a " certificate" for every MWh of renewable electricity that they produce, while electricity suppliers are obliged to buy such certificates.

The main objective of the Swedish electricity certificate system is to increase the production of renewable electricity with 25 TWh by 2020 compared to that in 2002.[2] Between 2002 and 2011, the production of renewable electricity increased by approx. 13 TWh, principally by means of bio power and wind power.

HOW "THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY CERTIFICATE MARKET" WORKS BETWEEN SWEDEN AND NORWAY.

① The energy producers receive one electricity certificate for each megawatt hour (MWh) of renewable energy produced, over a maximum 15 years.

② The electricity certificates are sold in a market where prices are determined by supply and demand. In this way, the producers receive extra income in addition to the energy price.

③ Demand for electricity certificates arises in that energy suppliers and certain electricity customers are obligated by law to buy electricity certificates corresponding to a certain proportion (quota) of their calculation-relevant electricity consumption.

④ The electricity end user pay for the development of renewable energy production because the cost of the electricity certificates is included in electricity bills.

⑤ Every year, the market participants with quota obligations must cancel electricity certificates in order to fulfil their quota obligation.

Source: The Norwegian-Swedish Electricity Certificate Market – Annual Report 2015

In 2012, Norway joined the same system and together the two countries built a joint certificate system. Electricity certificates represent a form of financial support for the production of electricity from renewable energy sources in Norway and Sweden. The electricity certificate system is market-based and is intended to increase energy production from renewable energy sources in a cost-effective manner.

Fighting Against the Climate Change

Climate change poses an unprecedented threat to our lives and societies. It has immense consequences for human security across the globe. It is obvious that the way we organize our society and the way we use natural resources are having a global long-term impact on the ecosystem of our planet. The old model of achieving wealth through excessive use of natural resources has proved to be outdated. Some may argue that the call for a paradigm shift of development is too challenging. Sweden, however, sees a land of opportunities in transforming itself and the world towards sustainable development.

The Swedish parliament decided in 2009 that Sweden was to have a fossil independent

vehicle fleet by 2030. In 2018, in a press release, Sweden announced to take a positive view of the level of ambition in the strategy, with its aim of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.[3]

In the Sweden's Seventh National Communication on Climate Change report, it is stated that emissions of greenhouse gases in Sweden - excluding emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) - fell by 25% over the period 1990–2015 and are expected to continue to decrease. As part of the EU-28, Sweden takes on a quantified, economy-wide emission reduction target jointly with all other Member States both under UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol for the periof of 2013–2020. The Swedish energy system is partly based on domestic sources of renewable energy such as water, wind and biofuel. [4]

According to the International Energy Agency, the Swedish goals in the energy and climate area by 2020 are:

- 50 % share of renewable energy of the total energy usage.

- 10 % share of renewable energy in the transport sector. The target for the transport sector should be seen in the light of the Government's long-term ambition that Sweden should have a vehicle fleet that is independent of fossil fuels and with no net emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.

- 20% increase in the efficiency of energy usage. The target is expressed as a cross-sectoral target for reduced energy intensity of 20% between 2008 and 2020.

- 40 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. The target applies to the sector outside the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and is equivalent to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 20 million tons compared to the 1990 level. Two-thirds of these reductions will take place in Sweden and one-third in the form of investments in other EU countries or in flexible mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).[5]

Conclusion

In the 21st century, climate change is one of the greatest challenges that we have to face. Especially following the signing the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015 within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, dealing with greenhouse-gas-emissions mitigation, adaptation, and finance, starting in the year 2020, countries start to change the paradigm of their climate diplomacy and policies for focusing on advancing the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Humanity needs a green new deal for many reasons, most obviously due to the climate crisis and insecurity on extreme weather conditions. Each new climate report describes the severe consequences of climate change with increasing alarm and the window of opportunity for action is closing. It should be said that replacing fossil fuel-based electrical generation with renewable energy sources is a critical step in slowing and ultimately stopping the global warming. Let us not witness – if not become the victims of - worse rainfalls and floods, to say the least.

End Notes

1   TRI Global Energy, "Fossil Fuels: The Core of the Climate Change Crisis" https://www.triglobalenergy.com/climate_change

2   International Energy Agency (IEA), "The Electricity Certificate System" https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/sweden/name-21727-en.php

3   Government Offices of Sweden, "Sweden positive on EU long-term climate strategy", published in the period between 03 October 2014 – 20 January 2019, https://www.government.se/press-releases/2018/11/sweden-positive-on-eu-long-term-climate-strategy/

4   UNFCCC,"Sweden's Seventh National Communication on Climate Change": https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/annex_i_natcom_/application/pdf/6950713_sweden-nc7-1-swe_nc7_20171222.pdf

5   IEA, "An integrated climate and energy policy framework: "A sustainable energy and climate policy for the environment, competitiveness and long-term stability": https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/sweden/name-42459-en.php

CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Russian Challenge
The EU cannot find a way to lessen its energy dependency on Russia. The EU is also passive against Russia's military maneuvers.

Brexit
UK leaves the EU on 29 March 2019 with or without a deal.

Responsibility of France & Germany
After the Debt Crisis in 2008, Germany and the French politicians to criticize their politicians for carrying the entire burden of the EU.

Migration Crisis
Italy criticizes the EU's failure in finding a solution to its migration crisis. Over the last 5 years, approximately 10,000 migrants died in the Mediterranean Sea.

Sanctions against Poland & Hungary
The EU is preparing to impose sanctions on Poland and Hungary for violating the Union's values. Anti-EU parties are dominating Poland and Hungary's politics.

A dead end: EU-Turkey relations
The EU-Turkey relations have come to a freezing point. Membership negotiations are deadlocked. Turkey no longer views EU membership as essential as before.

Structural Issues
- **The EU failed against Russia's maneuvers.**
  The EU made insufficient effort over South Ossetia (2008) and Crimea Crisis (2014).
- **The EU remained passive in "Arab Spring".**
  The EU's values are not seen exemplary for the peoples of the "Arab Spring" and it failed to establish a common foreign policy in Syria.
- **The EU's struggle for integration continues.**
  No political and economic integration has been achieved. The economies of Eastern European countries lag behind the EU's economic leaders.
- **The far right and populism is rising in the EU.**
  The right wing and anti-EU populist parties' votes in France, Germany and Austria, begin to increase.
- **The membership motivation is failing in the Balkans.**
  The EU is unable to deliver the benefits of its membership, especially post what happened in the Western Balkans in the early 2000s.

INSAMER

Islamic Banking;
The Solution for the Failing Conventional Banking

ABDUL BASİT BABA ISSAH

E conomy is one vital pillar on which every civilization, state, and country depend upon. The Conventional banking system has been the banking model and transaction tool used for decades; this system depends solely on capitalism where the profits and benefits are centered on certain groups.

The capitalist economic system is deteriorating and has not been able to withstand the test of time; the global financial system is unstable and collapsing due to the capitalistic economic ideology across the world.

The world has witnessed how Europe was hit with a debt crisis since 2008 when many European countries to experience the collapse of financial institutions, not to mention the skyrocketed government debt which led to the collapse of Iceland's banking systems and other problems faced by Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain in 2009.

According to Investopedia, the European Sovereign Debt Crisis had led to a loss of confidence in European businesses and economies. The website stated a number of factors that worsen the crisis in Europe. Greece's massive debt and the Brexit movement in the UK clearly threatened the European economy. And the situation was only made worse by the total breakdown of one of the biggest economy of Europe, Italy. This phenomenon triggered social unrest in most of the European countries, where unemployment alone has risen to 21% particularly in Greece. The source also added that the ongoing economic and banking crisis would have a long-term effect on the European overall economy.

The African continent also had its share in facing the global conventional banking crisis; between the year 2015 and 2018 the continent experienced a financial catastrophe. In Ghana for example, eight indigenous banks collapsed (UT bank, Capital bank, Uni Bank Ghana limited etc.) this year; in Tanzania six banks went down (Efatha Bank Ltd., Covenant bank Women, Twiga Bancorp etc.); while Nigeria, Uganda, Mozambique, Kenya, and other African countries went through similar crisis.

Causes of these crises

The causes of the conventional banking system failure can be looked at from the following aspects:

Capitalistic Economic Ideology: Capitalism as the ideology of conventional banking system has from the beginning served as a vulnerable foundation, in which strong and reliable transactions cannot be built upon. A financial institution should aim to aiding the community and nations at large but in reality the current financial institutions' products and transaction models pose as a threat to communities and countries. This is because this model is established to profit and benefit the rich and the elites.

Bank loans have shifted their function from helping people such as young entrepreneurs to have a strong business foundation. Today, financial institutions would not provide a loan without a valuable collateral, where in most cases is an impossible prerequisite for loan seekers. And to make matters worse, the collateral is the added interest on the loans set by the financial institutions for certain period. These interests sometimes exceed the loan acquired by a customer within a short period and the financial institutions would claim the collateral if the loans are not settled on time.

Here it is clear that the benefits and profits are centered only on the banks and not the customers. And again when it comes to investment it is obvious that the banks benefit

from these investments far more than the customers and investors. All these products in the conventional banking system and other products and transactions constitute in the collapsing of the capitalist ideological banks across the globe.

Mismanagement: Banking mismanagement is also responsible in pulling down the conventional banking systems. Mismanagement of resources and authorities has evidently led to the collapse of conventional banks, especially in the African continent. People are being employed in financial institutions not because of their credentials in the area of finance and economy but rather due to favoritism, nepotism, and tribal affiliations and relations. Consequently, many banks in the African continent are filled with unqualified employees and the result of this error is clearly shown. And then corruption is also rampant due to abuse of the authorities in these institutions.

Islamic Banking's Potentials

The ongoing banking crisis in the world today would prove that the Islamic model of banking is the viable alternative that can rescue conventional banking from disaster. Unlike the capitalistic model of banking, the Islamic banking system focuses on the entire stakeholders involved in monetary transactions, the individuals (customers and depositors), the communities and the financial institutions. In order to improve the economy and public welfare, these elements should all benefit from their transactions.

The Islamic model of banking and transactions can help the economy from crisis and disaster in the following areas:

> *The Islamic banking system does pay attention about public welfare.*

Absence of Interest: the beauty and outstanding aspect of the Islamic economic system is the absence of interest throughout its entire monetary transactions and products. From here alone we can see that the products in Islamic finance focuses on the benefits of all stakeholders involved and not only the financial institution as it is in conventional banks. From here it is safe to say that the Islamic banking system does pay attention about public welfare.

Any form of interest is prohibited in Islamic financial transactions to enable the poor to gain benefits, which in the long run would raise the status of society economically and minimize financial-related crimes. A non-interest loan in Islamic economic system enables the customers and the needy to benefit from the loans and repay it at the given time without any fear of added interest. This form of loan could support struggling entrepreneurs and not the other way round.

The concept of collateral is available in Islamic financial transactions especially in loans but what differs from the conventional system is that the Islamic financial institutions may extend the loan payment deadline without burdening the costumer with interest or a raise of payment. This system helps the customer to work harder with full concentration because there is no interest or rise in payment of the loan.

Risk Sharing through Mudaraba: One of the weaknesses of the conventional banking system is in the area of risk management and this happens as a result of the greed-driven centered benefits of few. This greed has led to the collapse of many financial institutions across the globe. However, if there is a lost in a transaction or investment it is the bank that

has to retrieve these monies to the owners and most of the time financial institutions go down due to these types of crises.

The Islamic banking system comes with a product called Mudaraba (partnership) where it involves an investor (customer) and business aspect (financial institute) to commit in it. In this contract both profit and loss are shared between the two parties instead of being centered on one party. This can serve as today's best investing model which can replace many products in conventional banking and avoid unbearable risks and collapse as the world is experiencing today.

Future of Islamic Banking

The Islamic finance sector is booming, not only in the GCC region but also in Europe and the West, as we can see how London is now a leading hub of Islamic banking in Europe. Islamic banking has reached new levels of maturity in the past fifty years.

According to Euronews, Islamic banking is forecasted to be worth 3 trillion dollars by 2021 with Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and the UAE currently leading the market.

The 2017 Islamic Finance Development Report stated, "It is expected that on average the growth rates of Islamic Finance sector will be 9.5% per year, which significantly exceeds the growth rate of the conventional banking institutions in the key region of the world."

> *The conventional banking system, (…) is currently in crisis and deteriorating alongside its declining status.*

In 35 countries, Muslims constitute as the majority of the population, and in 28 countries Islam is the states' religion, these countries include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan amongst others. The Islamic banking potential for Muslims alone is already significant. Religious aspects clearly could develop the system. Besides, the risks in Islamic financial sector is lower compared to the conventional model, and we can now witness that the conventional banking is adopting several products of the Islamic finance system and not the other way round.

Conclusion

The conventional banking system, which has been the model of financial transactions for decades, is currently in crisis and deteriorating alongside its declining status in the major regions of the world. Conventional banking could not stand the test of time while, on the other hand, Islamic finance has been growing for the past fifty years and innovational ways of banking and new products have been introduced throughout these years.

Islamic banking is growing both in the GCC region and the Western countries. It has more risk management tools than conventional banking and it is considered by the IMF as a means to better the economy of major world regions. Islamic finance is capable of replacing the conventional banking model and it has proven its viability and it is still growing.

BEING A WOMAN IN SYRIA!

Syrian women are exposed to many kinds of torture in prisons due to their opposition.

13.000 Captive Women

22.900 Murdered Women

300.000 Wounded Women

7,5 MILLION Women Asylum Seekers

WHY ARE WOMEN BEING DETAINED IN SYRIA?

- Opposing the government
- Participating in Protests
- Due to the opposition of a family member
- Being a medical staff treating the opponents
- To blackmail the spouse or other family member

CAUSES OF DEATH OF CAPTIVE WOMEN IN SYRIA

- Extrajudicial execution
- Torture
- Hunger and thirst
- Non-hygienic environment

iNSAMER

Visit **insamer.com/en**
for *Infographics, Muslim Minorities*
and *Crisis Monitoring.*

IHH Humanitarian and Social Research Center

Humanitarian and Social Research Center (INSAMER) is a hub conducting and promoting critical and relevant research on key humanitarian, social and political issues. Our mission is to ease human suffering by conducting practice-based research and producing knowledge that provides guidance to researchers and policy-makers. Our research is dedicated to extending humanitarian relief, enhancing humanitarian diplomacy and advancing the human rights. We are part of the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation.

Fields of Study

Humanitarian Diplomacy
Humanitarian Relief
Humanitarian Law
Human Rights
Xenophobia
Migration
Economy
Terrorism
History
Politics

DRILL A WATERWELL,
BE REMEDY FOR THE THIRST

iHH
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOUNDATION

BE PRECIOUS LIKE WATER!

Each waterwell is a new life source for them.