Unlike the routine visits of French presidents to Africa’s Francophone sphere, this time the French president paid a visit to an anglophone country, Kenya, where France has neither colonial history nor inherited weight. This visit itself unveiled something that France would never have admitted just a few years ago; that is, France can no longer take its traditional partners for granted. While attending the 2026 Africa Forward Summit that took place in Nairobi, Macron opened, unprecedentedly, his speech in English and switched in less than a minute to French. This was perhaps the most candid metaphor of France’s dilemma in Africa that seemed to be a power attempting to rebrand itself in a language it has not yet learned to speak fluently.
Framing The Shift
For decades, Africa had long been treated by French governments as a sphere of privileged influence, governed by a colonial and paternalistic logic. This started since the invasion and occupation of the first African state, Algeria, in 1830. However, the Nairobi summit, attended by many African heads of states, has transformed what France has been building for decades. France arrives now to a point as a supplicant not as the unchallenged hegemon across Francophone Africa (West and Sahel). This summit was the first France has ever attended in an English-speaking country in Africa, a cautious signal that Paris is “seeking to overhaul its engagement” after the massive loss of its former colonial sphere. Macron proclaimed $27 billion in investments focused mainly on agriculture, energy transition, AI, and technology.
Yet, this ambition was challenged by Kenya's President William Ruto who said unambiguously that any new partnership “must not be built on dependency but on sovereign equality, not on aid or charity but on mutually beneficial investment”[1]. As the audience gave a strong applause to such an inevitable statement, another viral footage took place at the University of Nairobi where Macron reprimanded young African students, accusing them of showing “total lack of respect” as they had been talking during his speech. African commentators and civil society blasted Macron’s scolding as inappropriate and highlighted the “schoolmaster” mindset rather than “partner” spirit. Zimbabwean politician Fadzayi Mahere noted, "They are not your kids... Imagine if a guest of state did the same in your country?"[2]. Control Risks analyst Beverly Ochieng also noted that France's new direction (intention) remains untested: "It's too early to tell if this is a successful pivot, as the partnership has only just been established."[3]
The Era of Paternalism
After formal decolonization spanned between 1956 and 1977, France governed its African sphere through what is called Françafrique. In a comprehensive definition, Françafrique is an architecture system administering military bases, resource extraction and exploitation, currency dependency, and above all compliant governments that align with France’s will. Thousands of French enterprises operate across Africa in viable sectors from Orange telecom to nuclear energy firm Orano. The CFA franc—pegged to the euro—still ties more than 200 million people across 14 countries to the French Treasury. After decolonization, the acronym was reinterpreted to stand for Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community). However, the original nomination used to be Colonies Françaises d'Afrique (French Colonies in Africa). Such a system has received severe criticism as a colonial artifact that held back African countries from building their own independent financial institutions.
Alain Antil and Thierry Vircoulon, two senior IFRI analysts, noted France’s accumulated grievances over decades: "military interventions, the persistence of the regional currency inherited from colonial time, development aid policy, restrictive visa policy"[4]. This highlights an important development regarding France's narratives and transformed reasoned criticism into a wide-ranging rejection of Paris's paternalism.
Drivers of Change
The collapse of Françafrique looked like a cascade. In just between 2021 and 2023, military coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso resulted in a cancellation of defence agreements between these countries and Paris. French ambassadors were expelled. French troops were ordered to leave. The three countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in late 2023 and formally withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2025. Further, well-established French allies collapsed literally in other countries. Defence cooperation in Chad had been terminated by end of 2024. The new President of Senegal, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, who also attended the Nairobi Summit, declared French bases “incompatible with sovereignty”. The most loyal partner of France, Alassane Ouattara of Ivory Coast, claimed the departure of French troops by December 2024. Five years was enough to reduce the number of French troops to less than two thousand from roughly ten thousand. Thierry Vircoulon drew an honest conclusion: “There is a clear collapse of French policy in Africa. The withdrawal of the French troops and basically the end of the French military presence in Africa is a symbol of that collapse”[5]. This conclusion is debatable of course as France tries to relocate itself in other parts of Africa.
Economically, the features of that collapse are no less damaging. The bilateral trade of sub-Saharan Africa (48 countries combined) with France amounted to only $28 billion in 2023 which is a modest rate representing less than 2% of French total exports. Orano, which operated uranium exploitation in Niger for 50 years, lost operational control of its mines right after the 2023 coup. Eventually, the national mining company Somair took over the 63% stake that was once owned by Orano.
Reorientation towards Partnership
Macron’s speech at the Nairobi Summit appears to mark the honest articulation of a rectified doctrine. He admitted that the era of the European schoolmaster is over: “Previously European chiefs would lecture African leaders on what they needed. This is no longer what Africa needs or wants to hear. That's just as well, because we, too, no longer have the means, if we're being honest”. He claimed that Paris wanted to develop partnerships “on an equal footing, founded on shared interests and tangible results”. However, this self-awareness was instantly tested! He claimed himself in a press conference as a “true Pan-African”, a statement that was broadly ridiculed on African social media. Scolding students at the University of Nairobi, repeatedly shouting “hey” asking them to calm down, has been seen as a controversy. As Al Jazeera's Shola Lawal remarked, his “controversial statements at the Nairobi summit raised questions among many Africans on social media about how seriously France will take its promises”[6].
In the same vein, as France claims partnership as a base for any future cooperation with Africa, some observations arise to frame this approach. Yannick Lefang, CEO of an intelligence firm, claimed that “our data suggests the reality is more a redistribution of influence than a full retreat”; in contrast to the widespread headlines that frame ‘France is leaving Africa’. In fact, France has strengthened ties with Kenya and Nigeria (neither was a French colony) while signing a 5-year defense pact with Nairobi and approximately a $350 billion investment agreement with Abuja in 2024. Despite the orientation towards partnerships with African sovereign states, Vircoulon of IFRI prescribed what France should stand for in Africa; that it must “demilitarize” its African relations wholly and compete solely on economic and cultural terms.
The New Players in Figures
As France has been forced to leave, the space it vacated is not remaining empty. Among the countries that fit such space are China, Russia, Türkiye, and Morocco.
China has become Africa’s largest economic partner with a trade balance of $296 billion in 2024, totaling 22% of Africa’s total trade. At the 2024 FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) summit that took place in Beijing, President Xi Jinping announced a $51 billion investment to fund over three years 30 infrastructure and 30 clean energy projects across the continent. China canceled a long time ago tariffs on more than 90% of products from 20 African countries as well as offering zero-tariff status to all imports from 33 least-developed African countries.
The security vacuum left by France’s military leavings has been filled by Russia. Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic all invited Russian military personnel after expelling French troops. The trade between Africa and Russia reached $27 billion in 2024 which has almost doubled compared to 2019. The Third Russia-Africa Summit is scheduled for October 2026 in Moscow. Moreover, the AES states signed a deal with Russia for telecom and surveillance satellites in September 2024.
As for Türkiye, Türkiye-Africa trade grew from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $40 billion in 2025. The African footprint has been built effectively by Ankara. Turkish construction firms have a big share accounting for 18% or $100 billion of all their overseas contracts from Africa by 2025. Both African governments and African people increasingly see Ankara as a “less controversial actor” without any history of backing coups or colonial associations. Türkiye with its flagship Baykar has recently begun to deploy its defense technology in some African countries. The recent meeting of Niger President—Abdourahamane Tchiani—with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara demonstrates how Türkiye is a trustworthy partner. Several agreements have been signed between Türkiye and Niger in different sectors including higher education, defense, health care, and trade. Erdogan insisted that “We continue to develop our relations with African countries on the basis of equal partnerships, mutual respect, and win-win principles”[7].
Morocco is the gateway to/from Africa and has emerged as the most strategically ambitious broker. King Mohammed VI launched the Atlantic Initiative in 2023 aiming to provide an access to the Atlantic Ocean for landlocked countries in Africa (mainly Sahel states). This initiative is built upon a $1.6 billion deep-water port at Dakhla, to be accomplished by 2028. The port will relate to road and rail networks beside the $25 billion Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline. In May 2025, the foreign ministers of AES states paid a visit to Rabat to endorse the initiative and launch technical corridor mapping. Morocco, with the initiative, offers something concrete that is a sea route to global markets. Moreover, Morocco as an intra-African alternative has a massive financial expansion in Africa through Attijariwafa Bank, and “Fertilizer Diplomacy” through OCP state-owned phosphate company. Put simply, Morocco understands continental realities and challenges and has a lot to share with African countries based on win-win and South-South cooperation.
To recap, France has lost much influence in West Africa following a widespread anti-French sentiment. France's loss is not simply a diplomatic setback. Rather, it is a substantial repositioning of a continent in a multipolar age. Yet, Paris is trying to rebrand itself as a reliable ally for East Africa, at least for the case of Kenya and Ethiopia. Now that it has handed over control, under pressure, to more reliable and trustworthy partners and players; France would attempt to frame itself at its most power and resources to regain trust. As for African leaders and executives in other parts of Africa, it is now the best timing to redefine what France should be in Africa as a real partner with win-win plans rather than a neo-colonial top-down approach.
Footnotes
[2] Fadzayi Mahere (@advocatemahere), post on X, 11 May 2026.
[6] Lawal, "Can Macron's Kenya Visit Revive French Influence in Africa?".
More Readings
Russia Africa Ministerial Conference in Cairo Reinforces Economic Ties Analysis
Africa-China Trade Openness Without Industry
France's President Emmanuel Macron Defends Europe in Africa and Urges Investment
Scolding Macron Strikes Bum Note for France Reset with Africa
